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Abstract: 
The role of improved schooling has become controversial because expansion of school 
investment has not guaranteed improved educational outcomes. This thesis pays 
attention to why government investments in education have not produced the desire 
effects of increased educational attainment and higher enrolment rate. We show that the 
results depend on the methodology. We also provide evidence that the robust 
association between cognitive skills and economic growth reflects a causal effect of the 
economic benefits of effective school policy: we find that, countries that improved their 
cognitive skill, through different facets of school choice, autonomy and accountability 
over time experienced relative increases in their growth paths. We show that quality of 
education significantly matter for technological progress and that it is a source of 
divergence in OECD economies. We also analyse in a dispassionate way, voters 
influence on public policy especially, that pertaining to public school resource 
allocation, in one country India we take India because the country’s overall success 
story hides striking inter- and intra-state variation in literacy rates. There is suggestion 
that larger districts with more elected legislators and also districts with higher voter 
turnout benefit from greater allocation of public school resources, which in turn are 
expected to boost schooling outcomes. In other words, these results highlight the power 
of democracy in ensuring a better allocation of public school resources in our sample.  
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Chapter 1 introduction 
1. Introduction 
 
There is a voluminous literature on the determinants of economic growth. It started 
with the basic growth model of Solow (1957) which began with an aggregate 
production function where the output of the macro economy is a direct function of the 
capital and labour in the economy and then added an element of technological change 
to get the movement of the economy over time. The sources of this technological 
change, although central to understanding growth, were not an integral part of the 
analysis. Then augmented neoclassical growth theories, developed by Mankiw, Romer, 
and Weil (1992), extend this analysis to incorporate education, stressing the role of 
education as a factor of production.  
However, it has been difficult to compare the alternative models and to choose 
among them based on the economic growth data. Some of the variables that economists 
consider to be important for economic growth are difficult to use in empirical 
specifications because of lack of data. So, the many empirical models that have been 
used to explain the differences in cross-country long-run growth have also resulted in 
different, and sometimes conflicting, results.  
For example, Barro (1991), and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) focused their 
research on cross-section econometrics with growth rates of ten years regressed on 
country characteristics and their policies (GDP, government consumption, rule of law, 
terms of trade, democracy index and inflation rate). Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001) also focused their research on the effect of institutions on economic 
performance. Others, like Islam (1996) used panel data models to determine growth and 
convergence by estimating income as a function of factor accumulation and efficiency. 
They all found out that, after controlling for factor accumulation, institutions, and 
government policies, the level of education plays a large role in output differences.  
The fact is that the most prosperous economies of the world today exhibit the 
highest rates of educational attainment (UNDP, 2007) and the poorest countries 
happen to have very low educational rates. This is certainly not a coincidence. 
Education provides people with the tools they need to perform adequately in the job 
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market and enhance their productivity. Not only is the provision of high-quality 
education linked to economic prosperity, but also the lack of education creates a 
perpetuating state of poverty (Perry et al., 2006; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2007). 
Lack of human capital implies low productivity and low economic growth. And the 
result is poverty. Poverty reduces the capacity to absorb new human capital. And 
the cycle continues.  
The hypothesis is that human capital is an important growth determinant, and its 
accumulation and investment in it are among the key drivers of economic growth. For 
example Lucas (1988), Romer (1990a), and Aghion and Howitt (1998)) stress the role 
of education in increasing the innovative capacity of the economy through developing 
new ideas and new technologies. These are called endogenous growth models because 
technological change is determined by economic forces within the model. Under these 
models, a given level of education can lead to a continuing stream of new ideas, thus 
making it possible for education to affect growth even when no new education is added 
to the economy.  
Human capital enriched by education can lead to a reduction in absolute poverty 
and also improve health and nutrition. Therefore, it is natural to believe that a 
productive development strategy would be to raise the schooling levels of the 
population which is the initiative and a central element of the Millennium Development 
Goals (i.e., education for all).  
Human capital as a source of new knowledge shifts the production function 
upwards and generates worldwide economic growth. For example, after the Second 
World War, Europe was rejuvenated by the Marshall plan. The injection of huge money 
into the economy was a success because, although the infrastructures, i.e., physical 
capital had been destroyed, Europe still had available skills required for modern 
industry. On the other hand, foreign aid to third world countries has mostly resulted in 
failure because they lacked human capital, and therefore the injection of physical 
capital has been wasteful (Mincer (1981)). 
Azariadis and Drazen (1991) provide a different perspective on why countries 
grow at different rates. In their paper, they note that countries with unequal human 
capital endowments grow at different rates. They also found that an economy which is 
low in human capital needs government investment to make acquiring skills cheaper to 
bridge the differences in per capita growth among economies. In their own words, 
government intervention helps to avoid “low-development traps”.  
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Additional role for human capital is attracting other factors such as physical 
capital, which also contribute to per capita income growth. Skilled workforce attracts a 
lot of firms, making it worthwhile for other workers to acquire skills as well. This rise 
in education makes it more profitable for firms to invest or enter a country, which in 
turn reduces unemployment. Therefore education benefits both the educated and the 
uneducated. 
The underlying idea is that government spending on education is geared to boost 
school input, which in turn would boost educational attainment. However, even if 
schooling policy is made a focal point, many of the approaches undertaken do not seem 
very effective and do not lead to the anticipated outcomes. A key part of the 
explanation is that the United States uses its inputs much more productively than does, 
for example, Ghana. So, despite all the attributes of human capital as a panacea for 
growth, it is very difficult to measure it, because there are still unanswered questions on 
the level and type of human capital that is necessary to boost economic growth, and 
what the role of government policies toward human capital formation should be.  
In most countries, the ultimate responsibility and supervision of the school 
system remains with the state. But within this state supervision, both the operation and 
the funding of schools may show differing shares of public and private involvement. 
For example, schools may be operated (managed) by a public entity, but draw heavily 
on private funding, i.e., parents have to pay tuition fees, or schools are operated by a 
private entity (e.g., a business, the church) but obtain most of their funding from a 
public entity, which could be through base funding or vouchers. On average, across 
countries, 83% of schools are publicly operated, and the remaining 17% are managed 
by a private entity. But the share of publicly operated schools varies substantially 
across countries.  
These differences in resources in education, and in growth rate across developed 
economies have motivated a lot of debate on the role of education in fostering 
innovation and growth (Aghion at al. (2005), Romer (2000)). Other papers have 
studied funding of schools and its effect on growth, and also the effects of changing the 
mix of public education expenditure across primary, secondary and tertiary education. 
For example, the US devotes 3% of its GDP to tertiary education, whilst in Europe this 
is only 1.4% of GDP. These studies have come up with the following questions: Is this 
European deficit in tertiary education investment significant for growth? Do these 
cross-country differences in public and private involvement in the operation and 
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funding of schools matter for student achievement and economic growth? Or, are 
differences between the ownership structure and governance of schools the main 
reason behind the growth process? Our research is to shed light on these issues 
empirically using data collected from various sources. 
This paper uses internationally comparable data to provide cross-country 
evidence on the association between student achievement, quality of education and 
economic growth across different countries. We establish a causal relationship between 
education and economic growth and, more importantly, between educational policy 
initiatives and educational outcomes. 
  
2 Aims and objectives 
 
Although this thesis certainly does not provide (or aims to provide) definitive answers, 
we hope to show that it is fruitful to pay more attention to the construction of human 
capital and the way in which human capital accumulation is affected by institutions. In 
addition, without arguing that this road is the only one, we hope to show that a stronger 
focus on the question of how to accumulate human capital efficiently may have an 
impact on both theoretical and empirical studies on human capital and growth and how 
it is financed. This paper aims to contribute to the debate over the role of human capital 
(as in education) on growth, and investigate the determinants of human capital 
accumulation, emphasizing on the efficiency of human capital accumulation in terms of 
the quality of education and its effectiveness in enhancing growth.  
We also focus our attention on the allocation of public school resources in India: 
we argue that the greater political participation among voters in a district is likely to 
induce elected legislators to improve the tax-funded public service delivery in the 
locality, which among others would include distribution of public school inputs.  
Finally we analyse the effect heterogeneity of society has on the allocation of public 
school inputs. Given that political institutions play a major role in providing education 
and are led by people of different political persuasions, it is important to understand 
whether gender/caste characteristics of elected legislators would influence the policies 
they choose and how it impacts on people’s lives 
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3 Research questions 
 
A first and foremost question is what human capital actually is. Most studies 
include proxies such as ‘average years of education in a population’ without clarifying 
how they relate to human capital. The second question that comes to mind is how 
institutional development and educational policy in different countries will affect the 
accumulation of human capital. The third question is how human capital relates to 
economic growth, while the fourth question relates to the strength of the relation 
between human capital and growth. 
Given the main focus of this thesis, we try to answer some of the questions above. 
We also try to answer the following questions: Why does a dollar of educational 
spending yield different effects in Asia, Latin America, Africa and OECD countries? 
What do the weak links between government spending on education and educational 
attainment indicate? Do cross-country differences in educational policy matter for 
student achievement and economic growth? Are differences between the ownership 
structure and governance of schools important for long-run economic growth? Finally, 
does socioeconomic endowment matter, in securing greater shares of government 
funding? 
 
4 Thesis structure 
 
The dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 analyses why more spending 
in schools has not led to substantially better results in educational attainment and 
enrolment; Chapter 3 describes the relationship between the quality of education and 
growth, with primary focus on school policy, and finally, chapter 4 analyse the 
determinants of the allocation of school inputs in India. 
 
Chapter 2 
 
In a period of growing government deficits, public policy has come under closer 
scrutiny around the world, and as such it is important to examine why more spending 
on schools has not led to substantially better performance. Accordingly, this chapter 
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analyses the impact of real increases in government spending on schooling outcomes, 
both enrolment and attainment, at various levels of schooling. 
We build up a country-level data-set for the period 1980-2010 from various 
published sources. The baseline variables include government expenditure on education 
as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product, educational attainment, enrolment rate and 
growth rate of real Gross Domestic Product. Information on real GDP per capita and its 
growth is obtained from version 7.0 of the Penn World Tables (PWT70-Summers, and 
Heston). Unlike most existing studies, our sample covers both developed and 
developing/emerging economies for a recent period of time, considers a range of 
indices of enrolment and attainment that distinguishes between primary and secondary 
levels of schooling and also contributes to the literature by bridging the methodological 
gaps. In particular, we measure educational outcomes not only by net enrolment at 
primary and secondary levels, but also by educational attainment (i.e., the average 
number of years of education of working age population) at primary, secondary and 
overall (pooled) level. While we start with pooled OLS estimates for the sample 
countries, we compare these simple OLS estimates with the FE-OLS and dynamic 
GMM estimates, which not only minimise the biases arising from unobserved 
heterogeneity but also that from reverse causality (or simultaneity). It also offers all the 
advantages of OLS and it improves FE-OLS. It means that the static specification of the 
linear fixed effects is enhanced by including autoregressive coefficients (lagged 
dependent variables), which allow feedback from current or past shocks to current 
values of the dependent. 
 We find that results depend on the methodology and find that ceteris paribus 
government spending on education has positive impact on educational attainment, but 
no significant effect on primary or secondary school enrolment as such. There is little 
regional variation such that relative to the overall sample the effect of education 
spending on educational attainment is rather marginal in Africa. Accordingly, we argue 
that educational attainment is not just a matter of resources. Once you have reached 
an indispensable minimum to get the educational system going, in terms of 
buildings, materials, teachers and infrastructure in general, additional resources 
might just be absorbed by the system in a very inefficient way, which may involve 
some degree of unjustified overpayments or simply corruption. Something that really 
matters might be a complete structural reform in order to improve the quality of 
education in most countries.  
8 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
The objective of this paper is to revisit what is known about the role of education in 
promoting economic growth. Combining different data, we are able to construct a data-
set containing quality education based on 25 OECD countries, from 1980-2010. The 
data on GDP per capita and its growth for our analyses come from the Penn World 
Tables. Data on quantitative educational attainment are taken from the latest version of 
the Barro and Lee (2010) database. Using the insight of Hanushek and Kimko (2000), 
whereby growth is generated by cognitive skills of a country through high quality 
education, we establish a causal relationship between education and economic growth 
and, more importantly, between educational policy initiatives and educational 
outcomes. We then build on the motivation of these analyses to advance the literature 
on education and growth by enhancing the quality of the data. Our main innovation is 
to introduce education policies into the equation in order to show that education policy 
is closely associated with the long-run growth potential of OECD countries. We intend 
to assess the importance of the different facets of institutional structures of choice, 
autonomy and accountability to student achievements and economic growth. The 
analysis presumes that a country’s level of economic growth can sufficiently 
characterize the set of institutional features that are complementary to human capital. 
And for this purpose we investigate the relevance and statistical significance of 
cognitive skills, taking into considering the possible institutional structure of education.  
The investigation begins by instrumenting cognitive skills by some of the 
characteristics of educational systems in 25 OECD countries; this approach provides 
information on how variations in student outcomes that are related to educational 
policies affect growth. Our results suggest that different facets of a country’s 
educational policies, i.e., choice, autonomy and accountability, are strongly associated 
with the level of student achievement and economic growth across OECD countries.  
In highlighting the importance of policies affecting student achievement and 
economic growth, we add to the compelling evidence that cognitive skills are 
associated with better economic outcomes at country level and also the individual level. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Chapter 4 examines the determinants of the allocation of public school resources in 
Indian districts in the post reform period, 1992-2002. Given the pronounced inter- and 
intra-regional variation in literacy, our analysis particularly highlights the role of voter 
turnout, gender/caste of elected state assembly legislators and also the size of the 
districts on districts’ access to various public school resources, which in turn 
determines school performance.  
Using various official sources, we put together a unique two-period district-level 
panel data for 1992 and 2002. 
This includes All India School Education Survey (AISES) data, 1992-93 (6
th
) and 
2002-03 (7
th
), and Census data (1991 and 2001). District-level AISES data cover 
information on the number of recognised schools’ characteristics of teachers 
(gender/caste), and physical facilities (nature of school building, access to drinking 
water, lavatory within the school premises) at primary, upper primary and secondary 
levels of schooling. The 1991 and 2001 district-level Census data provide information 
on population composition (classified by gender/caste) and literacy rates for different 
age categories of the population (male/female and total), and access to various 
infrastructural facilities, which is important for our analysis.  
We merge 1991 Census data with 6
th
 AISES to generate district-level information 
for 1992. Similarly, we merge 2001 Census data with 7
th
 AISES data to generate the 
corresponding district-level information for 2002. 
Ceteris paribus, results using 1992-2002 fixed effects district-level panel data models 
from major Indian states identify significant and positive effects of voter turnout as well 
as district size on districts’ access to various public school resources, while politician’s 
gender and caste has rather limited effect on allocation of public school resources in our 
sample. In particular, there is suggestion that larger districts with more elected 
legislators and also districts with higher voter turnout benefit from greater allocation of 
public school resources, which in turn are expected to boost schooling outcomes.  
In other words, these results highlight the power of democracy in ensuring a better 
allocation of public school resources in our sample.  
Chapter 5 presents the major conclusions that could be drawn out from the present 
thesis.  
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Does Public Spending On Education Boost Educational Attainment: Recent 
Evidence from a Cross-Country Analysis 
Abstract 
 
In a period of growing government deficit, public policy has come under closer scrutiny 
around the world. Using recent cross-country panel data from 90 countries over 1980-
2010, the present paper examines the efficacy of public spending on education on a 
number of educational outcomes at different levels of schooling. We show that the 
results depend on the methodology and find that ceteris paribus government spending 
on education has positive impact on educational attainment, but no significant effect on 
primary or secondary school enrolment as such. We also observe some regional 
variation such that relative to the overall sample the effect of education spending on 
educational attainment is insignificant in Africa. In view of these results we discuss 
possible alternative policies, some of which will be tested in the subsequent chapters.  
JEL classification: H52; E62 
Keywords: educational attainment; public spending 
 
1. Introduction 
 
“Education is one of the most powerful instruments for reducing poverty and 
inequality.” (World Bank 2011). Education is equally central to enhancing country’s 
competitiveness in the global economy. Therefore, ensuring access to quality education 
for all, in particular for the poor and rural population, is central to the economic and 
social development of a country. The latter has galvanized unprecedented efforts to 
meet the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015 around the world.  
An important assumption in the development community is that public 
expenditure in education is the prime policy instrument for achieving desired 
educational outcomes. Public provision far exceeds non-governmental provision in the 
supply of schooling, particularly at the primary level, and public expenditure greatly 
exceeds private expenditure. Improving performance and achieving yet unfulfilled 
outcomes therefore involves increasing the volume, efficiency and effectiveness of 
public expenditure on education. 
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The pertinent issue is that merely allocating more public resources for the 
provision of quality education may not necessarily lead to desirable outcomes, 
especially if budget formulation execution and monitoring are malfunctioning (see 
Rajkumar & Swaroop 2008; World Bank 2003). The available empirical evidence on 
whether more resources from the government will translate into better educational 
attainment remains weak. This issue has generated a huge and controversial literature 
dating back to the 1960s (Coleman et al., 1966)
1
 and dominated by research from the 
USA. Hanushek (1996) in several well-known reviews of the US literature concluded 
that ‘there is no strong or consistent relationship between school resources and student 
performance’’.  Harbison and Hanushek (1992) found that only six out of 12 studies 
reported a statistically significant association between government expenditure on 
education and educational attainment in a sample of developing countries. Along the 
same line, Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008), using a pooled dataset of 91 developed and 
developing countries, discovered that the relationship between education, public 
spending and education failure rate was small and statistically insignificant. Anand and 
Ravallion (1993) too stated that per capita public spending on education in a country 
did not have any statistically significant effect on the country’s literacy rate.  
Some recent studies have highlighted the possible role of governance on the 
efficacy of public spending on education. Björkman (2006), for example, found that a 
higher share of grant reaches schools in less corrupt regions of Uganda, and that 
students in those regions scored 0.4 standard deviations higher in the primary level exit 
examination. Similarly, Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) found that a one percentage 
point increase in the share of public education spending to GDP lowers education 
failure rate by 0.7 percent in countries with good governance, but had no discernible 
effect in countries with weak governance.  
A common source of waste and inefficiency in education is resource 
misallocation and misappropriation within education ministries and the devolved 
bureaucracies through which public expenditure on education is channelled. Pritchett 
(1996) noted that all of the negative or ambivalent findings on public spending could 
potentially be a reflection of differences in the efficacy of spending. According to him 
                                                          
1 The Equality of Educational Opportunity Study (EEOS), also known as the "Coleman Study," was commissioned 
by the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1966 to assess the availability of equal 
educational opportunities to children of different race, color, religion, and national origin. This study was conducted 
in response to provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and serves as an example of the use of a social survey as an 
instrument of national policy-making.  
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these differences could be attributed to corruption and patronage, among others. In 
other words, a unit's worth of public spending does not necessarily buy a unit's worth of 
service. The argument is as follows, most spending on public education goes to finance 
school education, at present public financing is about 75% - 95% in most countries. An 
overwhelming proportion of school finance would be spent on staff salaries (both 
teachers and other staff) while the rest would finance other non-teaching school inputs. 
So it appears that most of this school level spending would have only limited direct 
impact on learning outcomes.  
There is also ample evidence that many schools in developing countries are not 
very effective in imparting learning, and operate far below any conceivable efficient 
frontier, often attributable to corruption at various levels,
2
 Structural inefficiencies, 
arising from administrative problems, weak absorption capacities, and lack of direct 
school inputs from the government and/or that of indirect inputs like teacher’s absence. 
This unsatisfactory state of affairs is all the more glaring given that each year the 
governments of developing countries spend about $260 billion on education
3
  (e.g., see 
Marlaine Lockheed and Adriaan Verspoor 1991; Ralph Harbison and Hanushek 1992; 
Hanushek 1995; Glewwe 1999a)  
Another factor is that many countries are well below the efficiency frontier in 
their use of public expenditure to produce educational outcomes. Low standards of 
quality and efficiency in poorly performing schooling systems are prevalent and 
persistent in poor countries, in poor regions within countries and among poor 
populations. Low standards cannot be corrected by higher levels of educational 
expenditure, without management and service delivery reform or within the context of 
current school organization. 
Spending on education may be more effective in countries with better-trained 
teachers; these countries can be expected, on average, to have higher income levels than 
                                                          
 
2 Corruption lowers private investment, thereby reducing economic growth even in countries in which bureaucratic 
regulation are very cumbersome. The negative association between corruption and investment as well as growth is 
significant both in a statistical and in economic sense. Mauro, 2001.  
 
3 A common source of waste and inefficiency in education is resource misallocation and misappropriation within 
education ministries and the devolved bureaucracies through which public expenditure on education is channelled.  
Reinikka and Svensson used panel data for 1991-1995 from a quantitative service delivery survey (QSDS) in Uganda 
to measure the ‘leakage’ of funds for education from their intended purposes. They found that only 13% of non-wage 
expenditures allocated to schools were actually received. The bulk of allocated spending was used by officials for 
administration, or for purposes unrelated to education, or was privately appropriated. (Non-wage recurrent 
expenditures are typically 25-35% of total recurrent outlays, though in Uganda they declined from 54% to 14% over 
the period as teachers’ salaries were raised). 
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others, and governance is generally better in these countries. Of course school inputs 
would have indirect effects on learning outcomes; for example, presence and 
perseverance of teachers matter; quality of school building, access to drinking 
water/toilets or playing fields may make schooling experience more enjoyable than 
otherwise. Educational attainment may also depend on educational motivation and 
child's interest in the school and again public spending may have direct little impact 
there.  
The available empirical evidence on whether more resources from the 
government will translate into better educational attainment remains ambiguous. First, 
it is difficult to compare existing studies because educational outcome variables are not 
consistent across countries. Studies are drawn from schools across many countries and 
contain information about a variety of measures of student outcomes. Data on 
enrolment rates are widely available, but they do not reflect quality differences across 
countries. Moreover, enrolment numbers, especially at the primary level, include 
repeaters as well as students that subsequently drop out of school. For example, Barro 
and Lee (2001) using primary school drop-out and repetition rates on a set of resource 
variables showed that resources are insignificant determinants of dropout and repetition 
rates. Using similar data, a study by Hanushek and Kimko (2000) showed that direct 
spending on schools is unrelated to student performance. While these bleak pictures 
concerning the ability of government expenditure to raise educational outcomes appear 
to represent the majority view in literature, there are some notable exceptions. 
McMahon (1999), report a robust and significantly positive impact of resources and 
grade five survival rates and another study by Wossmann (2000), using class size as the 
resource variable, reported a positive and significant impact. Baldacci et al. (2004) 
come up with even stronger finding that spending is the only determinant of combined 
primary and secondary enrolment which remains significant across a number of 
different econometric specifications.  
A further problem is that most related research in this respect predominantly 
focuses on the link between resources and educational performance within a country, 
particularly in the United States. Unfortunately, no such encompassing evidence is 
available for other countries perhaps because of lack of data availability. So it is 
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unclear whether the existing results holds
4
 when one considers some less developed 
regions, e.g., Africa as a whole or sub-Saharan Africa in particular. So it is important to 
re-examine whether a dollar educational spending yields the same effect in Asia, Latin 
America, Africa and OECD countries, other factors remaining unchanged.  
We aim to bridge these gaps in the literature, so we build a comprehensive panel 
data set of public spending on education
5
 and educational outcomes for 90 countries 
including many developing countries, drawn from Barro-Lee (2010), Penn World 
Tables and various UNESCO annual reports. The latter allows us to focus on direct 
measures of educational outcomes including enrolment and attainment. We also 
distinguish between primary and secondary enrolment and attainment rates in our 
analysis.  
Our aim therefore is to use the recent available data to analyse whether increased 
government spending in education will result in increased educational attainment and 
will increase in resources available to education increase enrolment rate in schools? 
Lack of appropriate data has meant that there have been relatively few studies exploring 
the relationship between government expenditure on education and outcome across 
countries. We also look at whether governance has a part to play in the effectiveness of 
allocating of public resources, especially in developing countries. 
Methodologically, we extend pooled OLS estimates and use fixed effect (FE) OLS and 
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) panel estimator. This is because pooled 
OLS estimates can be biased because of the presence of unobserved country-level 
heterogeneity in data. While FE-OLS estimates help redress the bias arising from 
omitted variables, it cannot resolve the bias arising from endongeniety or reverse 
causality with a dynamic framework. Hence our preferred estimates are the system 
GMM panel fixed effects estimates. By accounting for simultaneity, fixed effects, and 
lagged dependent variables as regressors, we try our best to identify the true effect of 
government spending on various educational outcomes.  
Our paper’s findings are robust to econometric specifications that allow 
government expenditure in education to influence educational outcomes at various 
                                                          
4
 See Hanushek (1996) ‘there is no strong or consistent relationship between school resources and student 
performance’ 
5
 The impact of public spending will depend on the degree to which public spending is translated to create effective 
public services. The ineffectiveness of public spending might include poor targeting of institutional inefficiency such 
as leakage in public spending and weak institutional capacity or the displacement of private sector effort by public 
spending. In this light it is common for various international financial institutions to ensure reducing unproductive 
expenditures and thus improving the delivery of public services.  
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levels of schooling, after controlling for various observed and unobserved factors that 
may also influence educational outcomes. There is evidence that government spending 
on education significantly boosts educational attainment, but it fails to have any 
significant effect on enrolment at any level of schooling. We also identify some 
regional variation in our data that highlights the insignificant effect of educational 
spending either on enrolment or attainment in Africa. It is argued that these results 
highlight that resources are necessary, but not sufficient for educational outcomes. As 
possible alternatives, one needs to probe into the varying institutional set-up in the 
education sector in the sample countries, with a view to resolve the conflict of interest 
between/among various actors.  
The paper is organized as follows, in section 2 we describe the data used. Section 
3 explains the methodology while section 4 analyses the empirical results. Finally 
section 5 concludes with essential policy implications of our results. 
 
2. Data Description 
 
We use various existing sources to construct five-yearly data for 90 countries over a 
thirty year period 1980-2010. Data on enrolment (primary/secondary) and government 
spending on education come from the UNESCO Annual Statistics (1980-2010) while 
information on school attainment is obtained from Barro and Lee (2010), who revised 
the original Barro and Lee (2001) series to eliminate anomalies in connection with 
attainment rate. Information on real GDP per capita is obtained from version 7.0 of the 
Penn World Tables (PWT70-Summers, and Heston).  
The measure of total government expenditure on education is expressed as a 
percentage of GDP in a given year. The latter shows the proportion of a country’s 
wealth being devoted to the development of education, which allows us to link 
education spending with real GDP per capita. The net enrolment rate is the total 
enrolment at a given educational level, divided by the population of the age group that 
typically corresponds to that level of education (after excluding the drop- outs and 
repeaters). Our data enables us to distinguish between primary and secondary 
enrolment rate. We also observe educational attainment, which measures the highest 
level of education attained for the population aged 25 and above. This measure 
excludes students that drop out of school prematurely and is not affected by number of 
repeaters and as such can be used as a proxy for quality of education, in contrast, 
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enrolment rates correspond to some measure of quantity of education provided. We 
acknowledge that there are vast differences in quality between school systems across 
countries. However, qualitative measures of human capital are not widely available and 
when they exist, they do so for a small group of relatively developed countries. 
We also obtain various country-level institutional indices including a measure of 
corruption from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG 1984-2010). The ICRG 
index of corruption is a subjective measure prepared by experts on a regular basis for 
international business, which measures corruption within the political system.  We 
chose the corruption index because in our opinion corruption affects not only the broad 
macroeconomic variables such as government investment and growth but also income 
distribution. Government officials may use their authority for private gain in designing 
and implementing public policies. (Tanzi and Davoodi 1997).  In this way, corruption 
distorts the government's role in resource allocation. It has been further contended that 
corruption increases poverty by creating incentives for higher investment in capital-
intensive projects and lower investment in labour-intensive projects (United Nations 
Development Programme, 1997). Such a bias in investment strategy deprives the poor 
of income-generating opportunities. The corruption index is measured on a scale of 0 to 
6, with higher values indicating lower levels of corruption.  
 
2.1. Descriptive statistics 
A list of our regression variables is summarised in Table A1. The table also shows the 
corresponding means and standard deviations of these variables.  
The complete data covers 90 heterogeneous countries over 30 years (1980-2010), 
thus giving rise to a sample of country-year observations of 630. There is however 
some missing observations for some variables as highlighted in Table 1. The mean 
value of educational attainment is 6.8 years. The average share of government 
expenditure on education (in GDP) is about 4.4% of GDP and ranges from 12.9% to 
0.8% of GDP. The mean value of corruption index is 3.3 on a scale of 0-6. Note that 
higher value of the index indicates lower level of corruption. We need to bear this in 
mind while interpreting the estimated coefficients. 
The countries included in our sample are rather heterogeneous in all respects. 
Therefore the specification measurement is likely to suffer from heterogeneity 
uncertainty, which means that it unclear which subsets of countries obey a common 
linear model. So it is important to identify the regional variation in this respect. To this 
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end, we classify these countries into four groups, namely, OECD, Asia, Africa and 
Latin America. The corresponding descriptive statistics by region are shown in Table 
A2. Clearly, both share of public spending and educational attainment are the highest in 
OECD countries. Expenditure and cost differences between countries make it difficult 
to establish norms of cost-effectiveness or standard prescriptions for reform, because 
expenditure and efficiency levels achievable in some parts of the world may simply not 
be attainable elsewhere.  
Real schooling expenditure per student increased substantially in most of the 
sampled OECD and East Asian countries. The question of interest is whether this vast 
expansion of school ing resources per student led to an improvement in students’ 
educational performance. Many Asian countries have been able to achieve significant 
educational results at modest cost. Drop-out rates are lower, educational attainment are 
higher and education expenditure as a share of GDP is lower in East Asia than in other 
regions. In many African countries similar levels of expenditure relative to GDP are 
inadequate to raise achievements to within striking distance of international goals. 
Among the non-OECD sample countries, highest share of public spending is observed 
in Africa (4.7% of GDP), followed by Latin America (4.1% of GDP) and Asia 4.1% of 
GDP), note however that educational attainment is the highest among the Asian 
countries 7.8, closely followed by Latin America 7.3. In contrast Africa tends to have 
the lowest educational attainment among the non-OECD sample countries, thus 
questioning the efficacy of public spending on education for imparting learning. The 
latter induces us to control for the ICRG corruption index (0- most corrupt and 6 least 
corrupt).  
In an attempt to understand the relationship between education spending and 
educational outcome, we consider various non-parametric kernel plots for selected 
measures of educational outcomes. 
First Figures A1 to A4 show the non-parametric Epanechnikov kernel regression of 
government educational expenditure on educational attainment rate in the full sample. 
Similarly figures A5-A6 show the corresponding kernel regression of primary and 
secondary enrolment rates on government spending on education. Evidently the effect 
of government spending on enrolment is much flatter than that for educational 
attainment for much of the distribution of government spending on education. We next 
conduct some multivariate analysis to examine if this holds after controlling for other 
factors as well.  
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3. Methodology  
 
This section describes the econometric methods that we use to assess the relationship 
between public spending on education and educational attainment. One way to model 
empirically the macroeconomic contribution of government spending to educational 
attainment is to use cross country education productions of the following form:  
 
                                     (1) 
 
where Ait is the index of educational attainment in country i in year t.  
This model allows us to examine the impact of government investment on 
educational attainment of 90 heterogeneous countries over 30 years (1980-2010). 
Educational attainment is expressed as a function of one period lagged values of share 
of government spending on education and other control variables x rates, which are 
measures of quantity and access to education in each country. Second, we use a 
composite index of educational attainment (educat) which is a measure of internal 
efficiency in the education system, we are also able to distinguish educational 
attainment between primary, secondary levels and tertiary education.  
Our central explanatory variable of interest is the share of government spending 
on education (in GDP). The underlying idea is that a higher share of education spending 
by the government will to some extent boost educational outcomes. Other factors 
remaining unchanged, our analysis particularly focuses on the size and significance of 
estimated    that captures the marginal effect of government spending on indices of 
educational attainment.  
In addition, we include country specific intercepts (    The country specific 
intercepts can be seen as picking up any bias arising from country-specific fixed 
effects. It also allows permanent differences in the level of income between countries 
that are not captured by       . We also include year specific fixed effects (     to 
minimise any bias arising from unobserved year specific effects. 
Other control variables include real GDP per capita and an index of corruption. 
The index of corruption is added as an independent variable to determine the efficacy 
of public spending in boosting educational attainment.  
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3.1. Econometric issues 
Several econometric problems may arise from estimating equation (1): because 
our empirical results are based on OLS regression methodology, which assumes that 
public spending is exogenously determined. However, it is possible that the two main 
variables in our analysis, public spending and educational attainment, are jointly 
determined (endogenous)
6
.  Although we have used one period lagged value of the 
explanatory variables to determine educational attainment as in equation 1, one can still 
raise questions about endogeneity bias of our estimates. There is also the possibility of 
reverse causation. For example, it is likely that when a government is faced with poor 
and/or deteriorating educational attainment status of their citizens, governments 
increase spending on education. Other problems include omitted variable bias and 
measurement errors in the regressors. 
To address the problems, we first use FE-OLS estimates that control for both 
country and year specific unobserved heterogeneity in our data and any omitted 
variables that are constant over time. However the use of fixed effects to address 
unobserved heterogeneity can bring substantial gains in robustness, but not without 
costs. For example fixed effect which is based on within country variation does not take 
into consideration dynamics of adjustments.  Given this unattractive trade-off between 
robustness and efficiency, we use the dynamic model GMM advocated by Arellano and 
Bond (1991), and Arellano and Bover (1995) to eliminate the fixed effect problems. 
 The motivation for dynamic modelling GMM are (1) that it offers all the 
advantages of OLS and (2) it improves FE-OLS and also act as a robustness check of 
our educational outcome estimates. It means that the static specification of the linear 
fixed effects in equation 1 is enhanced by including autoregressive coefficients (lagged 
dependent variables), which allow feedback from current or past shocks to current 
values of the dependent variable   . 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 A variable is endogenous if it is correlated with the disturbance i.e. in this equation                          
         is endogenous if                 is exogenous if            , OLS estimate will be consistent only 
if    [     ]   . (Wooldridge 2002; 2006).   
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3.2. Dynamic GMM  
We use the Generalized-Method-of-Moments (GMM) estimators developed for dynamic 
panel data that were introduced by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1990), Arellano and 
Bond (1991), and Arellano and Bover (1995) as follows: 
 
                                                                                       (2) 
 
where A is the index of educational attainment, X represents the set of explanatory 
variables,   is an unobserved country-specific effect,   is year specific fixed effects,   
is the error term, and the subscripts i and t represent country and time period, 
respectively. We also use time dummies to account for period-specific effects. We 
rewrite equation (2) as: 
 
                      
                (3) 
 
To eliminate the country-specific effect, we take first-differences of equation (3), which 
act as instruments to deal with the endogeneity of the explanatory variables; 
 
                                                     ) (4) 
 
However the new error term             is correlated with the lagged dependent 
variable,            . So Under the assumptions that the error term is not serially 
correlated, and the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous (i.e., the explanatory 
variables are uncorrelated with future realizations of the error term), the GMM dynamic 
panel estimator uses the following moment conditions. 
 
 [       (           )] = 0 for s ≥ 2; t = 3,…,T (5) 
 
 [       (           )] = 0 for s ≥ 2; t = 3,…,T (6) 
 
 
There are, however, some shortcomings with this difference estimator, when the 
explanatory variables are persistent over time i.e. government expenditure in education, 
lagged levels make weak instruments for the regression equation in differences. 
Instrument weakness influences the asymptotic and small-sample performance of the 
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difference estimator. Asymptotically, the variance of the coefficients rises. In small 
samples, weak instruments can bias the coefficients. See Alonso-Borrego and Arellano 
(1996) and Blundell and Bond (1997) 
To reduce the shortcomings, we use a new estimator that combines in a system 
the regression in differences with the regression in levels (Arellano and Bover’s 1995 
and Blundell and Bond 1997). The instruments for the regression in differences are the 
same as above. The instruments for the regression in levels are the lagged differences of 
the corresponding variables. These are appropriate instruments under the following 
additional assumption: although there may be correlation between the levels of the 
right-hand side variables and the country-specific effect in equation (3) but there is no 
correlation between the differences of these variables and the country-specific effect, 
i.e.  
 [         ] =  [         ]                    (7) 
and  [         =  [         ] for all p and q         (8) 
 
The additional moment conditions for the second part of the system (the regression in 
levels) are 
 [(               ) (       )]    for s = 1  (9) 
 [(               ) (       )]    for s = 1        (10) 
 
 
Thus, we use the moment conditions presented in equations (5), (6), (9), and (10), use 
instruments lagged two periods (t-2), and employ a GMM procedure to generate 
consistent and efficient parameter estimates.  
Consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of the instruments. To 
address this issue we consider two specification tests suggested by Arellano and Bond 
(1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1997). The first is a Sargan 
test of over-identifying restrictions, which tests the overall validity of the instruments 
by analysing the sample analog of the moment conditions used in the estimation 
process. The second test examines the hypothesis that the error term  i,t is not serially 
correlated. In both the difference regression and the system difference-level regression 
we test whether the differenced error term is second-order serially correlated (by 
construction, the differenced error term is probably first-order serially correlated even if 
the original error term is not).  
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4. Results and discussion 
 
This section presents and analyses the baseline estimates of educational attainment and 
also various robustness checks that we perform. Our central objective is to estimate the 
effects of public spending on education on educational outcomes after controlling for 
other determinants influencing education attainment/enrolment. In doing so, we also try 
our best to redress the potential biases arising from omitted variables and simultaneity. 
 
4.1. OLS estimates of educational outcomes 
We start with an analysis of the OLS estimates of equation (1). Tables 1 and 2 show the 
simple OLS estimates of various educational outcomes: total educational attainment as 
well as educational attainment for primary, secondary and tertiary levels. We also 
determine net enrolment rate of primary and secondary education (nerp, ners).  
        Table 1 shows the estimates of total educational attainment. Here we show 
estimates for four specifications as we include additional explanatory variables. In all 
specification, lagged government spending is significantly and positively linked with 
educational attainment. It is also evident that the estimate is hardly affected by the 
inclusion of lagged GDP per capita as a control variable which enters the model 
positively and statistically significantly. Specification (4) is the most complete 
specification which still suggests a positive and significant effect of lagged government 
spending on educational attainment when we include the lagged corruption index and a 
dummy of Africa. Evidently, the Africa dummy is negative and significant, suggesting 
a lower level of educational attainment for Africa. Also the lagged corruption 
coefficient is negative and significant, suggesting that less corrupt countries (i.e., those 
with lower levels of corruption) experience a lower educational attainment, other things 
remaining unchanged. This is a counter-intuitive result and we would argue that this 
may be attributed to the OLS estimation bias that cannot take account of the 
unobserved country-level factors influencing educational outcomes. 
Table 2 shows the OLS estimates of educational outcomes by schooling levels. 
Four measures of educational attainment are used. In all columns (corresponding to 
different measures of educational attainment, lagged government expenditure has a 
positive and significant effect on educational attainment. Lagged government 
expenditure also affects net Primary education enrolment rate and secondary education 
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enrolment rates positively and significantly and the magnitude of the effect is especially 
high for secondary enrolment rate. Among other results, real GDP per capita has 
positive effect on attainment and enrolment rates, except secondary school attainment 
rate and primary school net enrolment rate. Further, the corruption index coefficient is 
still negative and significant in all columns except net primary enrolment rates.  
 
Educational outcomes by regions 
We also explore if the effects of government spending on educational outcomes may 
vary across the geographical regions in our sample. The underlying idea is that regions 
with better institutions, e.g., better budget formulation, execution and monitoring may 
experience better educational attainment as government expenditure increases (World 
Bank, 2003). Thus, we re-ran the educational attainment regressions for different 
geographical regions, namely, OECD, Asia, Africa and Latin America, in our sample, 
using simple OLS. 
Table 3 shows the simple OLS estimate for these four regions. In the four 
columns of the OLS regressions, government spending is significantly and positively 
linked with educational attainment after controlling for lagged government expenditure 
in education in all regions, except for Africa. The coefficient of lagged government 
spending is negative and insignificant for Africa. Lagged real GDP is highly significant 
in all four column but as with the last regressions very low explanatory power. The 
corruption index is negatively significant for countries within OECD, which is again 
counter-intuitive. The corruption index on Africa is negative but insignificant. 
The case of Africa is of special interest to us as it is the region with very high 
government spending share and yet one with the lowest educational attainment. Table 4 
shows the OLS estimates of various educational outcomes for Africa.  It is interesting 
to note that the effect of government spending on educational attainment is negative 
and insignificant for this subsample too irrespective of the choice of educational 
outcomes. Lagged GDP per capita is significant in all regressions except primary net 
enrolment and the lagged corruption is also insignificant other than secondary school 
attainment rate.  
 
4.2. FE-OLS estimates of educational outcomes 
One may however argue that the OLS estimates are likely to be biased because of 
possible omitted factors. Hence next we consider the FE-OLS estimates that control for 
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both country and year specific unobserved heterogeneity in our data. These estimates 
are summarised in Table 5 for the full sample that controls for both country and year 
specific unobserved fixed effects. Evidently, government expenditure on education is 
positive and significant for all attainment indices except tertiary school attainment rate. 
It is also not significant for primary enrolment rate, but turns out to be positive and 
significant for secondary enrolment rates. These FE-OLS estimates are not very 
different from the OLS estimates in table 4. Note that in this case the corruption 
coefficient turns out to be insignificant for most indices.  
In Table 6 we consider the FE-OLS estimates of various educational outcomes for 
Africa only. These FE-OLS estimates reiterate the insignificant effect of government 
spending on the various education outcome variables for Africa as we have seen in the 
OLS regression results summarised in Table 4. There is no significant effect of 
government expenditure on any of the attainment rates and also the enrolment rate. It 
also reiterates the positive effect real GDP have on some indices, which is similar to 
table 4. 
 
4.3. Dynamic GMM estimates results 
Table 7 summarizes the GMM estimates of changes in educational attainment as a 
function of lagged values of share of government spending on education and other 
explanatory variables. This is an extension of the FE-OLS estimates as it allows us to 
take account of the dynamics where educational outcomes depends on past educational 
outcomes as well as lagged government expenditure, among others. Thus we expect 
current educational outcomes to respond to past outcomes. The process of adjustment 
may depend both on the passage of time (which indicates the importance of lagged 
values of these changes as regressors) and on the difference between equilibrium 
outcome and the previous year’s actual level.  
We use forward orthogonal deviations proposed by Arellano and Bond 1995 to 
preserve gaps in our data, this solves autocorrelation problems. We use generalized 
method of moments (GMM) with linear moment conditions, which amounts to the 
requirement that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the error term in the 
growth regression in equation (1). The economic meaning of these conditions is that the 
instrumental variables can only affect educational attainment through government 
expenditure and the other variables in the conditioning information set. A crucial 
assumption for the validity of GMM is that the instrument is exogenous. To test this 
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condition, we use Sargan’s test of the over identifying restrictions, and we cannot reject 
the given moment conditions.  Note that the Sargan and Hansen tests do not reject the 
econometric specification7. All the diagnostic tests indicate a well specified model.  
After controlling for all other factors, the coefficient of government spending on 
attainment is positive and significant, thus highlighting the beneficial role of spending 
on educational attainment.  Unlike the FE-OLS, estimates government spending on 
education has insignificant effect on primary net enrolment and secondary school net 
enrolment rates. A comparison of the spending effect on primary, secondary and 
tertiary attainment suggests that the marginal effect is the highest at the primary level. 
In particular 1 standard deviation (i.e., 1.7 as shown in table A1) increase in 
government spending would enhance primary educational attainment by 
0.216*1.7=0.3672 years.   
It is also noteworthy here that the corruption coefficient now turns out to be 
positive and significant. In other words, other things remaining unchanged, less corrupt 
countries tend to have better educational outcomes. We believe that this is the true 
effect of corruption in our sample as GMM redresses the shortcomings of OLS and FE-
OLS. Table 8 also redresses the shortcomings of OLS and FE-OLS for the subsample 
(African countries), government expenditure on education is significant and positive for 
primary enrolment rate, but insignificant for other variables. Also the corruption 
coefficients for the indices have the right signs with column 1, 3, and 4 positive and 
significant.    
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
In a period of severe constraint on government budget around the world, it is important 
to understand the efficacy of public spending on education for delivering education 
around the world with a view to design public policy. Using a rich cross-country data 
from a sample of 90 countries over the period 1980-2010, the present paper updates the 
existing literature with a view to inform the policy makers.  
Unlike most existing studies, our sample covers both developed and 
developing/emerging economies for a recent period of time, considers a range of 
                                                          
7 Sargan test of over identifying restrictions: chi2(2)    =   2.77  Prob > chi2 =  0.250 
Hansen test of over identifying. restrictions: chi2(1)    =   2.03  Prob > chi2 =  0.154 
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indices of enrolment and attainment that distinguishes between primary and secondary 
levels of schooling and also contributes to the literature by bridging the methodological 
gaps. In particular, we measure educational outcomes not only by net enrolment at 
primary and secondary levels, but also by educational attainment (i.e., the average 
number of years of education of working age population) at primary, secondary and 
overall (pooled) level. While we start with pooled OLS estimates for the sample 
countries, we compare these simple OLS estimates with the FE-OLS and system GMM 
estimates which not only minimise the biases arising from unobserved heterogeneity, 
but also that from reverse causality (or simultaneity).  
We compare the full sample estimates with those from different developing 
regions of the world. Our analysis highlights the importance of GMM estimates and 
suggests that government spending on education has positive and significant effect on 
educational attainment at all levels and the effect is largest at the primary level. We 
however fail to identify any significant beneficial effect of government education 
spending on primary and secondary enrolment levels, which primarily been guided by 
household decisions. Further despite very high level of government education spending 
in Africa, we do not find any statistically significant effect on educational attainment or 
enrolment in Africa who needs it most. 
This evidence implies that just providing more resources is unlikely to improve 
student performance if future actions of schools follow their past behaviour. While 
schools i n  s o m e  r e g i o n s  seem to make good use of additional resources, 
others do not. In other words, a general increase in school resources does not 
necessarily promise significant positive improvements in student performance. A 
possible solution may lie in changing the incentive structure of the main actors in the 
schooling system rather than changing the level of available resources. The most 
important and most promising way forward for future research in this area therefore 
seems to be to look for evidence on the effect of the institutional set-up of the 
schooling system, since this will generate the incentives with a view to promote 
educational performance of students.   
Accordingly, one needs to consider alternative policies, e.g., private intervention, 
public school autonomy and/or encouraging students to attend schools by providing 
incentives (e.g., mid-day meals, scholarships, text books, uniforms, laptops) to deliver 
‘education for all’, which has met with some success in some parts of the world.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1. OLS estimates of educational outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Educational 
attainment 
Educational 
attainment 
Educational 
attainment 
Educational 
attainment 
     
Lagged Government 0.258*** 0.257*** 0.266*** 0.322*** 
Expenditure on 
education 
 
(0.0524) (0.0521) (0.0525) (0.0499) 
Lagged Real GDP per   0.000987** 0.000758* 0.000639* 
Capita 
 
 (0.000389) (0.000397) (0.000384) 
Corruption index   -0.173*** -0.161*** 
   (0.0584) (0.0563) 
 
Africa    -4.678*** 
    (0.411) 
 
Constant 6.017*** 5.707*** 6.343*** 7.398*** 
 (0.370) (0.390) (0.420) (0.391) 
 
Year dummies no no no Yes 
 
Observations 540 540 535 535 
Number of countries 90 90 90 90 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2. OLS estimates of educational outcomes by schooling level  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Educational 
attainment 
Primary 
school 
attainment 
rate 
Secondary 
school 
attainment 
rate 
Tertiary 
school 
attainment 
rate 
Primary 
school net 
enrolment 
rate 
Secondary 
school 
enrolment 
rate  
       
Lagged 0.322*** 0.123*** 0.178*** 0.0178*** 0.725** 1.433*** 
Government 
expenditure on 
education 
 
(0.0499) (0.0244) (0.0277) (0.00623) (0.326) (0.330) 
Lagged 0.000639* 0.000303* 0.000192 0.000119** 0.00208 0.00459* 
Real GDP per 
capita 
 
(0.000384) (0.000183) (0.000216) (4.78e-05) (0.00252) (0.00250) 
Lagged -0.161*** -0.0593** -0.0879*** -0.0136* -0.561 -0.884** 
Corruption 
Index 
 
(0.0563) (0.0272) (0.0314) (0.00701) (0.368) (0.369) 
Africa -4.678*** -2.536*** -1.733*** -0.408*** -24.44*** -45.85*** 
 (0.411) (0.301) (0.198) (0.0519) (2.430) (3.610) 
Constant 7.398*** 4.842*** 2.163*** 0.413*** 91.88*** 71.94*** 
 (0.391) (0.225) (0.208) (0.0489) (2.473) (2.878) 
 
Year dummies Yes yes yes yes yes Yes 
 
Observations 535 535 535 535 532 534 
 
Number of 
countries 
90 90 90 90 90 90 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: OLS estimates of educational attainment by regions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Educational 
attainment 
Africa 
Educational 
attainment 
Asia 
Educational 
attainment 
Latin America 
Educational 
attainment 
0ECD 
     
Lagged -0.0616 0.216** 0.216** 0.274*** 
Government 
expenditure on 
education 
 
(0.110) (0.105) (0.105) (0.0688) 
Lagged 0.000760*** 0.000231*** 0.000231*** 0.00657*** 
Real GDP per capita 
 
(0.000135) (6.93e-05) (6.93e-05) (0.00132) 
Lagged -0.180 0.220 0.220 -0.297*** 
Corruption 
 
(0.116) (0.210) (0.210) (0.0713) 
Constant 3.331*** 4.039*** 4.039*** 9.160*** 
 (0.637) (0.886) (0.886) (0.560) 
     
Observations 
 
100 73 73 185 
Number of countries 25 19 19 35 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. OLS estimates of educational outcomes for Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Educational 
attainment 
Primary 
school 
attainment 
rate 
Secondary 
school 
attainment 
rate 
Tertiary 
school 
attainment 
rate 
Primary 
school net 
enrolment 
rate 
Secondary 
school net 
enrolment 
rate 
       
Lagged  -0.0616 -0.00111 -0.0379 -0.00210 -0.869 0.836 
Government 
expenditure on 
education 
 
(0.110) (0.0747) (0.0387) (0.00501) (1.331) (1.317) 
Lagged  0.000760*** 0.000433*** 0.000316*** 2.16e-05*** 0.00247 0.00630*** 
Real GDP per 
capita 
 
(0.000135) (9.81e-05) (4.84e-05) (5.35e-06) (0.00158) (0.00122) 
lagged -0.180 -0.0862 -0.0988** -0.000802 0.465 -0.497 
Corruption 
 
(0.116) (0.0770) (0.0406) (0.00590) (1.540) (1.206) 
Constant 3.331*** 2.264*** 0.901*** 0.0599** 71.74*** 16.13** 
 (0.637) (0.452) (0.226) (0.0277) (7.780) (6.932) 
       
Observations 100 100 100 100 75 41 
 
Number of 
countries 
25 25 25 25 23 17 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5. Fixed effects OLS estimates of educational outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Educational 
attainment 
Primary 
school 
attainment 
rate 
Secondary 
school 
attainment 
rate 
Tertiary school 
attainment rate 
Primary 
school net 
enrolment 
rate 
Secondary 
school net 
enrolment 
rate 
       
Lagged  0.217*** 0.106*** 0.103*** 0.00697 0.541 0.892*** 
Government 
expenditure on 
education 
 
(0.0518) (0.0251) (0.0292) (0.00652) (0.362) (0.335) 
lagged 0.000823** 0.000317* 0.000353 0.000153*** 0.00127 0.00559** 
Real GDP capita 
 
(0.000383) (0.000185) (0.000216) (4.82e-05) (0.00267) (0.00248) 
Lagged corruption -0.317*** -0.0826*** -0.205*** -0.0302*** -1.017** -1.424*** 
Index 
 
(0.0573) (0.0277) (0.0323) (0.00721) (0.400) (0.371) 
Constant 7.032*** 4.286*** 2.353*** 0.393*** 87.77*** 63.12*** 
 (0.337) (0.163) (0.190) (0.0424) (2.355) (2.184) 
Country FE 
Year FE 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Observations 535 535 535 535 532 534 
 
R-squared 0.117 0.069 0.121 0.067 0.022 0.064 
 
Number of 
countries 
90 90 90 90 90 90 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6. FE-OLS estimates of educational outcomes for Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Educational 
attainment 
Primary 
school 
attainment 
rate 
Secondary 
school 
attainment 
rate 
Tertiary 
school 
attainment 
rate 
Primary 
school net 
enrolment 
rate 
Secondary 
school net 
enrolment 
rate 
       
lagged 0.0224 0.0412 -0.0133 -0.00553 -0.0179 1.570 
Government  
Expenditure on 
education 
 
(0.124) (0.0810) (0.0431) (0.00661) (1.514) (1.571) 
lagged 0.000922*** 0.000507*** 0.000382*** 3.42e-05*** 8.64e-06 0.00731** 
Real GDP per 
capita 
 
(0.000211) (0.000138) (7.32e-05) (1.12e-05) (0.00240) (0.00258) 
lagged -0.166 -0.0900 -0.0791* 0.00322 0.194 -0.740 
Corruption index 
 
(0.121) (0.0794) (0.0422) (0.00647) (1.637) (1.274) 
Constant 2.605*** 1.950*** 0.611** 0.0442 74.39*** 12.18 
 (0.704) (0.460) (0.245) (0.0376) (8.760) (10.36) 
Country FE 
Year FE 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Observations 100 100 100 100 75 41 
 
R-squared 0.279 0.227 0.348 0.115 0.000 0.359 
 
Number of 
countries 
25 25 25 25 23 17 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7.GMM estimate of changes in educational attainment by schooling level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Total 
educational 
attainment 
Primary 
school 
attainment 
rate 
Secondary 
school 
attainment 
rate 
Tertiary 
school 
attainment 
rate 
Primary 
school net 
enrolment 
rate 
Secondary 
school net 
enrolment rate 
       
government 1.474** 0.216** 0.0221** 0.0574** 1.411 3.422 
Expenditure on 
education 
 
(0.587) (0.0986) (0.120) (0.0366) (1.969) (4.034) 
Real GDP 0.00459 0.000892 0.000354 -0.000139 -0.0121 0.0162 
Per capita 
 
(0.00322) (0.000685) (0.000372) (0.000156) (0.00878) (0.0161) 
corruption 0.897** 0.161** 0.0688** 0.00442** -0.892 2.653 
 (0.368) (0.0657) (0.0536) (0.0193) (0.943) (2.237) 
 
Lagged  0.771***      
educational 
attainment rate 
 
(0.193) 
 
     
Lagged 
primary 
 0.872***     
School 
attainment rate 
 
 (0.0723)     
Lagged    1.033***    
Secondary 
school 
Attainment rate 
 
  (0.0585)    
Lagged tertiary    1.098***   
School 
attainment rate 
 
   (0.0967)   
Lagged net     0.615**  
Primary 
enrolment rate 
 
    (0.234)  
Lagged       0.937*** 
Secondary 
school 
Enrolment rate 
 
     (0.225) 
Constant -9.016** -1.030 -0.0629 0.328 35.41* -24.68 
 (3.980) (0.798) (0.697) (0.235) (20.20) (21.65) 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 533 532 532 532 419 344 
Number of 
countries 
90 90 90 90 87 80 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Sargan  test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   3.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.180 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   5.25  Prob > chi2 =  0.572 
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Table 8.GMM estimate of changes in educational attainment by schooling level for subsample 
(Africa) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Total 
educational 
attainment 
Primary 
school 
attainment 
rate 
Secondary 
school 
attainment 
rate 
Tertiary 
school 
attainment 
rate 
Primary 
school net 
enrolment 
rate 
Secondary 
school net 
enrolment 
rate 
 
       
lagged 0.892***     3.330 
Educational 
Attainment rate 
 
(0.0916)     (2.259) 
government 0.201 0.138 0.0540 0.00296 5.263* -11.13 
Expenditure on 
Education 
 
(0.169) (0.129) (0.0480) (0.00878) (3.172) (28.84) 
Real GDP 6.79e-05 1.11e-05 5.30e-05 7.57e-06 -0.00294 0.0138 
Per capita 
 
(0.000159) (0.000109) (5.57e-05) (9.11e-06) (0.00586) (0.0299) 
corruption 0.202* 0.136 0.0667* 0.00549 4.873* 5.937 
 (0.120) (0.0886) (0.0396) (0.00674) (2.720) (16.31) 
 
lagged  0.907***     
Primary school 
Attainment rate 
 
 (0.0863)     
lagged   0.865***    
tertiary school 
Attainment rate 
 
  (0.113)    
lagged    0.790***   
Primary school 
enrolment net 
Rate 
 
   (0.140)   
lagged     1.031*  
Secondary 
school 
Net enrolment 
rate 
 
    (0.621)  
Constant -0.755 -0.483 -0.256 -0.0166 -3.557 58.15 
 (0.782) (0.616) (0.192) (0.0435) (29.51) (119.7) 
       
Observations 108 108 108 108 71 46 
Number of 
countries 
25 25 25 25 23 18 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   0.60  Prob > chi2 =  0.742 
  Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   0.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.692 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variable label Abbreviation Mean (sd) 
Number of 
observations 
Government expenditure on 
education 
Govoe 4.4(1.7) 622 
Educational attainment Eduat 6.8(3.1) 630 
Net enrolment rate, primary Nerp 86(17) 627 
Net enrolment rate, secondary Ners 63(27) 628 
Real GDP per capita rgdpch 315(181) 630 
Index of corruption (least 
corrupt=6) 
Corp 3.3(1.4) 625 
Democratic accountability                      dema                            4.4(0.5)                   628 
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Table A2 Summary statistics 1999-2004 – a regional perspective 
 
 OECD Asia Africa Latin America All 
 
Mean(standard 
deviation) 
Mean(standard 
deviation) 
Mean(standard 
deviation) 
Mean(standard 
deviation) 
Mean(standard 
deviation) 
Government 
expenditure 
on education 
 
4.9(1.2) 4.1(1.9) 4.7(1.7) 4.1(1.9) 4.4(1.6) 
Educational 
attainment 
 
10.8(1.8) 7.8(2.5) 3.3(1.3) 7.3(1.0) 7.7(3.4) 
Net 
enrolment 
rate, primary 
 
95(4.7) 92(7.3) 71(19) 91.5(7.3) 86(16) 
Net 
enrolment 
rate, 
secondary 
86.1(8.6) 63(16.7) 30.2(18) 63.5(16.1) 63(27) 
corruption 
index(least 
corrupt=6) 
4.4(1.27) 2.7(0.8) 2.5(1.03) 2.7(0.8) 3.3(1.4) 
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Figure A1 Kernel plot between educational attainment (Eduat) rate and government expenditure 
on education 
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Figure A2 Kernel plot between primary school (Eduatps) attainment rate and government 
expenditure on education 
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Figure A3 Kernel plot between secondary school attainment rate (Eduatsec) and government 
expenditure on education 
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Figure A4 Kernel plot between tertiary school attainment rate (Eduatter) and government 
expenditure on education 
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Table A5: Kernel plot between net primary school enrolment rate (NERP)  and government 
expenditure on education(GOVOE) 
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Table A6: Kernel plot between net secondary school enrolment rate (NERS)  and government 
expenditure on education 
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The effects of cognitive skills and educational policy on economic growth in OECD 
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The effects of cognitive skills and educational policy on economic growth in OECD 
countries 
 
Abstract:  
 
Research in the economics of growth, both theoretical and empirical, has thus far 
produced surprisingly few resilient results about policies that might promote long-run 
growth in developed countries. Using panel growth regressions for 25 OECD countries 
and six five year periods (1980-2010), our analysis suggests that human capital 
measured in terms of cognitive skills in international achievement tests of Mathematics, 
Science and Reading have a large effect on long-run economic growth.  We provide 
evidence that the robust association between cognitive skills and economic growth 
reflects a causal effect of the economic benefits of effective school policy: we find that, 
countries that improved their cognitive skill, through different facets of school choice, 
autonomy and accountability over time experienced relative increases in their growth 
paths. In highlighting the importance of policies affecting student achievement and 
economic growth, we add to the compelling evidence that better test scores are 
associated with better economic outcomes at country level and also the individual level. 
  
JEL-Code: 120, O40. 
Keywords: education, growth, cognitive, skills, choice, autonomy, accountability, 
OECD. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The answer to the question regarding what educational policy will produce long-run 
growth in developed countries is mixed, and has occupied the minds of economists and 
policymakers for a long time. Governments around the globe have for decades worked 
to improve their education systems in order to provide the best education possible to 
their country, but the outcomes have generally fallen short of expectations. Nowhere is 
this more apparent than in the context of economic growth, where educational 
investments have not appeared to generate the economic outcomes promised by 
theoretical growth models (Hanushek and Woessmann (2012). 
Thus, it is not surprising that several countries have embarked on national 
initiatives aimed at improving the foundations and competitiveness of their education 
system. This means shaking up bureaucratic inertia and approaching a more advanced 
form of education, i.e., reforming the institutional structure of their school systems (see 
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Aghion, 2007).
8
  It also means shifting away from simply ensuring access to schooling 
to an interest in the quality of learning. Spending more on public education in the hope 
that the additional resources would translate into better student outcomes has been 
shown by Hanushek, 2002, as not to guarantee more learning, and also not to have any 
significant effect on student achievement.  
 The objective of this paper is to revisit this analysis and review what is known 
about the role of education in promoting economic growth. Further, we establish a 
causal relationship between education and economic growth and, more importantly, 
between educational policy initiatives and educational outcomes. We then build on the 
motivation of these analyses to advance the literature on education and growth by 
enhancing the quality of the data. Our main innovation is to introduce education 
policies into the equation in order to show that education policy is closely associated 
with the long-run growth potential of OECD countries. We intend to assess the 
importance of the different facets of institutional structures of choice, autonomy and 
accountability to student achievements and economic growth. The analysis presumes 
that a country’s level of economic growth can sufficiently characterize the set of 
institutional features that are complementary to human capital. And for this purpose we 
investigate the relevance and statistical significance of cognitive skills, taking into 
considering the possible institutional structure of education.  
The investigation begins by instrumenting cognitive skills by some of the 
characteristics of educational systems in 25 OECD countries; this approach provides 
information on how variations in student outcomes that are related to educational 
policies affect growth. Our results suggest that different facets of a country’s 
educational policies, i.e., choice, autonomy and accountability, are strongly associated 
with the level of student achievement and economic growth across OECD countries.  
We use the data that describes long-run growth for OECD countries on 
educational outcomes to estimate cross-country regressions. This follows a growing 
literature which, over the past ten years, demonstrates that consideration of cognitive 
                                                          
8 For example there is the English reform, which has two main features: an increase of yearly tuition fees and the 
Graduate Contribution Scheme. There is also the German Excellence Initiative (approved by the Schroeder 
government) which devotes 1.900 million €, over a period of five years, to a competitive program aimed at 
generating world class institutions from the matrix of the German universities and France’s approach, which put 
emphasizes in universities’ autonomy. (see Aghion 2007). 
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skills dramatically alters the assessment of the role of education and knowledge in the 
process of economic development.  
Analysing growth in 1960-1990 for a sample of 31 countries with available data 
(including 18 OECD countries), Hanushek and Kimko (2000) first showed a 
statistically and economically significant positive relationship between cognitive skills 
and economic growth. This relationship between cognitive skills and economic growth 
has been subsequently confirmed in a range of studies with different focuses. Most 
recently, Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) extend the empirical analysis to incorporate 
50 countries that have participated in one or more international test between 1964 and 
2003 and have aggregate economic data for the period, 1960-2000.  
The same type of exercise was carried out by Woessmann (2009), where he 
investigates whether a causal interpretation of the robust association between cognitive 
skills and economic growth is appropriate and whether cross-country evidence supports 
the economic benefits of effective school policy. As a starting point for our analyses, 
we replicate the basic analysis of Woessmann (2009), replacing the extended version of 
the Cohen and Soto (2007) data on years of schooling by the newly available latest 
version of the Barro and Lee (2010) database on years of schooling and also other 
recent economic data, but we also specifically test whether schools produce more 
output from an exogenous increase in their resources if they are more autonomous, 
accountable and face more competition and how these institutional policies affect 
growth.  
Economists have considered the process of economic growth for a long time, but 
over the past 20 years, have linked analysis much more closely to empirical 
observations and in the process rediscovered the impact human capital in the form of 
education has on economic growth. The empirical macroeconomic literature focusing 
on cross-country differences in economic growth employs measures of years of 
schooling
9
, to test the human capital aspects of growth models. Initial analyses 
employed school enrolment ratios (Barro (1991), and Mankiw, Romer and Weil 
(1992)). Subsequent works by others have attempted to distinguish among alternative 
mechanisms through which education affect growth. For example, Benhabib and 
Spiegel (1994) showed, based on cross-country regressions over the 1965-1985 period, 
that human capital accumulation (where human capital is measured by school 
                                                          
9
 Years of education are the same as educational attainment in our analysis. 
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enrolment) was not significantly correlated with growth, whereas human capital stocks 
were. More recent work by Krueger and Lindahl (2001), using panel data of number of 
years in education for 110 countries between 1960 and 1990, finds a positive 
correlation between growth and human capital stocks and the rate of accumulation of 
human capital. While school attainment has been convenient in empirical work because 
of its availability across countries, its use as a proxy for human capital is very 
restrictive. Not only does it ignore differences in school quality, but also other 
important determinant of people’s skills. It does not differentiate education by quality 
and quantity, the two were used as perfect substitutes in most models. A modified 
human capital, measured in terms of cognitive skills on international achievement test 
of Mathematics, Science and Reading by Hanushek and Kimko (2000) provides the 
necessary measurement to analysing education and growth empirically.  
Hanushek and Kimko find a statistically and economically significant positive 
effect of cognitive skills on economic growth in 1960-1990 that dwarfs the association 
between years of schooling and growth. Their estimates stem from a statistical model 
that relates annual growth rates of real GDP per capita to the measure of cognitive 
skills, years of schooling, the initial level of income, and a variety of other control 
variables. They find that adding cognitive skills to a base specification including only 
initial income and years of schooling boosts the variance in GDP per capita among the 
31 countries in their sample. At the same time, the effect of years of schooling is 
greatly reduced by including cognitive skills, leaving it mostly insignificant, while 
adding other factors leaves the effects of cognitive skills basically unchanged.  
This focus on cognitive skills has a number of potential advantages: first, it 
captures variations in the knowledge and ability that schools strive to produce and 
relate the outputs of schooling to subsequent economic growth success. Second, by 
allowing for differences in performance among students with different quality of 
schooling but possibility the same quantity of schooling, it opens the investigation of 
the importance of different policies designed to affect the quality aspects of schools. 
The question it raises is whether this strong relationship between cognitive skills 
and growth reflects a causal relationship that can support direct education policy, in the 
form of accountability, autonomy and choice, we try in this paper to shed light on this 
question.  
Proponents of greater accountability, autonomy, and choice contend that these 
reforms will improve student outcomes by heightening incentives for various actors to 
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perform at high levels. Accountability systems combine clear standards, external 
monitoring of results, and corresponding rewards and sanctions based on performance 
indicators. By providing better information on student outcomes, proponents argue, 
such systems directly and indirectly reward students, teachers, and school leaders for 
their efforts. Decentralizing decision-making to the schools, advocates suggest, 
substitutes the creativity and knowledge of local decision-makers for the inertia and 
rigidity of centralized bureaucracies. Supporters of school choice contend that giving 
parents free choice among schools and enabling private providers of education to 
receive government funding unleashes competitive forces that will drive school 
improvement. We also place a particular focus on how these three factors interact with 
cognitive skills to determine student outcomes and economic growth. 
While cognitive skills can be developed in a variety of ways, we focus on how it 
can be developed through education and how education policies affect it. Educational 
policy differs considerable by countries, with different countries pursuing very different 
policies. On average across countries, 83% of schools are publicly funded, and the 
remaining 17% are managed by a private entity. Even the share of publicly operated 
schools varies substantially across countries. And on other level there is a different mix 
of public education expenditure across primary, secondary and tertiary education. 
While US devotes 3% of its GDP to tertiary education, in Europe it is only 1.4% of 
GDP. These analyses enter into the debates about the relative importance of these 
education policies, we analyse how differences in the operation of schools affect 
student achievement and economic growth and also how differences between the 
ownership structure and policies of schools affect the growth process of countries. 
The paper proceeds as follows: in section 2 we provide a brief review of the links 
between the institutional structure and incentives in the school system, section 3 present 
the data, section 4 present our estimation strategy, where we first show the relationship 
between educational attainment and economic growth in OECD countries. We then 
analyse the growth of OECD countries where the education process takes account of 
accountability, autonomy, and choice.  This approach has great potential to shed light 
on the effects of institutional variation on student outcomes and impact on growth. Its 
chief advantage stems from the ability to exploit the substantial variation in education 
policies across OECD countries. Section 5 reports our results, and section 6 concludes. 
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2. Institutional structure and incentives in the school system 
 
Research on how school policy can successfully advance educational achievement is an 
expanding field that still leaves many open questions. However, available evidence is 
that institutional reforms are linked to substantial long-term economic benefits. 
All over the world, many countries tend to finance and manage the great majority of 
their schools publicly. However, the dominance of the public sector in education often 
limits incentives to improve student achievement while controlling costs. A lack of 
competition and choice in most state-run school systems often creates obstacles to 
leaving bad schools, thereby constraining the ability of parents to ensure high-quality 
education. Centralized bureaucracies often allow little flexibility at the school level, 
limiting school’s ability to respond to parental demands. And information on what 
students and schools actually achieve is often unavailable, hindering parent’s ability to 
make informed choices. The rationale for the recent wave of market-oriented reforms in 
the school system in many countries is to change this ( Woessmann 2005) 
The aim of market-oriented reforms is to enhance choice on the demand side, to 
provide suppliers with more autonomy, and to provide parents with more information 
about student outcomes. The main consequence of these changes in the institutional 
framework of the system is that they alter the incentives that actors face. The 
institutions of the school system are the set of rules and regulations that determine 
rewards and penalties for those involved in the schooling process. Economic theory 
suggests that people respond to these incentives, if the actors in the education process 
are rewarded for producing better student achievement, and if they are penalized for not 
producing high achievement, they will change their behaviour in a way that improves 
achievement. It is also argued that the ability to choose schools will open up 
possibilities for students who are locked in inferior neighbourhood schools and that the 
competitive market place will have great incentives to meet the needs of all students 
more fully than existing schools, and in the words of Godwin and Kemerer, 2002, 
market-oriented reforms may make the education system more equitable through open 
enrolment.  
While the relative lack of accountability, autonomy, and choice in the compulsory 
education sector as currently constituted tends to dull incentives to improve quality and 
restrain costs (see Hanushek 1995), market-oriented models may create incentives that 
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ultimately lead to better student learning. Attempts to provide parents with additional 
choice and to allow non-governmental providers to enter the education market clearly 
represent market-oriented reforms. And enabling the schools to exercise at least some 
autonomy is obviously essential for them to compete.  
In sum, institutional reforms that ensure informed choice between autonomous schools 
may be expected to improve student achievement because they create incentives for 
everyone involved to provide the best learning environment for students (see Bishop 
and Woessmann, 2004, for a general model of the institutional effects in education). 
As already stated, proponents of greater accountability, autonomy, and choice 
contend that these reforms will improve student outcomes by heightening incentives for 
various actors to perform at high levels. Accountability systems combine clear 
standards, external monitoring of results, and corresponding rewards and sanctions 
based on performance indicators. By providing better information on student outcomes, 
proponents argue, such systems directly and indirectly reward students, teachers, and 
school leaders for their efforts. Decentralizing decision-making to the schools, 
advocates suggest, substitutes the creativity and knowledge of local decision-makers for 
the inertia and rigidity of centralized bureaucracies. Supporters of school choice 
contend that giving parents free choice among schools and enabling private providers 
of education to receive government funding unleashes competitive forces that will drive 
school improvement. 
Evidence of market-oriented system of education does suggest some clear 
general policies that are important. Foremost among these is the incentives that the 
teachers face (see Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2009). That is, if the teachers in the 
education process are rewarded for producing better student achievement, and if they 
are penalized for not producing high achievement, achievement is likely to improve. 
The incentives to produce high quality education, in turn, are created by the institutions 
of the education system, the rules and regulations that explicitly or implicitly set 
rewards and penalties for the people involved in the education process. Therefore, the 
key to improvement appears to lie in better incentives that will lead to managerial 
decisions keyed to student achievement and that will promote strong schools with high-
quality teachers.   
Here, three interrelated policies come to the forefront: promoting more 
competition, so that parental demand will create strong incentives to individual schools; 
choice and competition in schools were proposed a half century ago by Milton 
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Friedman (1962). The idea is that parents, interested in the schooling outcomes of their 
children, will seek out productive schools. This demand-side pressure will result in 
incentives for each school to produce an effective and efficient education system. These 
incentives will also put pressure on schools to ensure high quality staff in addition to a 
good curriculum. In a cross-country comparison, students in countries with a larger 
choice tend to perform better on average (see Woessmann (2009), and recent evidence 
corroborates the conclusion that this is due to a causal effect of autonomy and 
competition (West and Woessmann (2010). 
 
3. Data  
 
Our analysis relies on measures of cognitive skills, developed by Hanushek and Kimko 
(2000) and Hanushek and Woessmann (2007). Employing direct cognitive skill 
measures has the significant advantage of permitting quality differences to arise from 
factors outside of formal schools. Hanushek and Kimko combined data from 
international tests given over the past 45 years in order to develop a single comparable 
measure of skills for each country that can be used to index skills of people in the 
labour force. They use data from six voluntary international tests of mathematics and 
science over the period 1964-1991. These tests were organized by two organizations: 
the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) and 
the International Assessment of Educational Progress (IAEP). Hanushek and 
Woessmann (2007) expanded the set of international cognitive skills to include several 
tests made available during the 1990s. The additional test score data were the Trends in 
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) of the IEA and the Programme 
for International Student Assessment (PISA) administered by OECD. 
PISA programme assesses the mathematical, scientific, and reading literacy of the 
student population in each participating country. The PISA test not only provides 
achievement data for representative samples of students in the participating countries 
but also a rich array of background information on each student and on the student’s 
school. The database provides an indicator for whether each student’s school is 
privately operated (as well as the share of its funding that it receives from government 
sources) or if it is a public school, defined as being managed directly or indirectly by a 
public education authority, government agency, or governing board appointed by 
government or elected by public franchise.  
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Combining the data, we are able to construct a dataset containing cognitive skills and 
educational institutional measures of OECD countries. These educational measures of 
specific control variables, choice, autonomy and accountability, are taken from Aghion 
(2007) and West and Woessmann (2010). 
All international growth rates are based on the Penn World Table data (Version 
7.0). Data on quantitative educational attainment and the levels of educational 
attainment are taken from the latest version of the Barro and Lee (2010) database. The 
dataset extends coverage of mean years of schooling data to 146 countries over 5-year 
intervals from 1950-2010, disaggregated by gender and age (15+ and 25+).  
Census and survey data obtained from UNESCO institute for statistics (1980-2010) and 
Eurostat (1980-2010) are used to construct estimates of net enrolment rate for both 
primary and secondary schools. The new data is an extension of notion of human 
capital that has been developing over the years and the key element here is to equate 
knowledge and skills across countries. 
 
3.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the 25 OECD countries considered in our 
study. The complete data covers 25 OECD countries over 30 years (1980-2010), thus 
giving rise to a sample of country-year observations of 175. The table shows the 
corresponding means and standard deviations of the variables.  
The table confirms that there is a wide variety in countries’ growth rates. For instance, 
the growth rate varies from lows of 1 to 9.2. Table 1 also shows a country’s average 
annual GDP per capita growth from 1980-2010, our main measure of development. 
What is also clear from the table is that both total years of education and cognitive 
skills vary widely, suggesting that any impact of these human capital measures on 
growth differences should be easily detected. 
Form the figures in the appendix we can assess the impact institutional measures 
have on economic growth when they are interacted with cognitive skills. While 
cognitive skills on its own have a positive impact, combined cognitive skills and any of 
the institutional measures have a much higher positive impact on economic  growth. 
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4. Methodology 
 
In this section we outline our methodological approach to our analysis on education and 
economic growth. To determine empirically the relationships among educational 
attainment, cognitive skills, education policies and growth we use a panel data set on 25 
OECD countries over six five-year time periods. 
Recent interest in economic growth has led to an upsurge of empirical analyses of 
why some nations grow faster than others. The standard method for establishing the 
effect of education on economic growth is to estimate cross-country growth regressions 
where a country’s average annual growth in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
over several decades is expressed as a function of measures of education and a set of 
other variables deemed to be important for economic growth. Our interest is on how 
appropriate education policies will impact on growth, we therefore measure human 
capital not only by the quantity of education but also by its quality (which is a 
reflection of cognitive skills in a country) and organizational characteristics of the 
education systems.  
With this objective in mind we show the relationship between educational 
attainment, cognitive skills and economic growth for the OECD countries.  This 
relationship takes the following form: 
 
                                                                                 (1), 
 
where a country’s growth rate (g) is a function of the skills of workers (h), termed 
human capital, and other factors (x) that include initial levels of income.  
Human capital is nonetheless a latent variable that is not directly observed. Hence, it is 
necessary to specify how h is measured. The vast majority of existing theoretical and 
empirical work on growth begins by taking the quantity of schooling of workers as a 
direct measure of human capital. 
In our opinion, a more satisfying alternative is to concentrate on the cognitive 
skills component of human capital which is the test-score measures of mathematics, 
science, and reading achievement (see Hanushek and Kimko, 2000). The use of 
cognitive skills means that we are able to capture variations in the knowledge and 
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ability that schools strive to produce, and thus relate the acknowledged outputs of 
schooling to subsequent economic success. It also allows for differences in 
performance among students with differing quality of schooling (but possibly the same 
quantity of schooling).  
In addition, we include country specific intercepts (   The country specific 
intercepts can be seen as picking up any bias arising from country-specific fixed 
effects. It also allows permanent differences in the level of income between countries 
that are not captured by   . We also include year specific fixed effects (    to minimise 
any bias arising from unobserved year specific effects, and the subscripts i and t 
represent country and time period, respectively.  
Although we used fixed effects to capture country-specific intercepts, regressions 
using cognitive skills across countries may be hampered by endogeneity biases.
10
  
Our empirical results are based on the OLS regression methodology, which assumes 
that cognitive skill is exogenously determined. The questions are, does higher cognitive 
skill cause educational policy or does educational policy cause cognitive skills and how 
can we separate the effects of these variables on growth? 
We address this issue in our analyses by using institutional structure of the school 
systems as instruments for the cognitive-skill measure, thereby using only that part of 
the international variation in cognitive skills that can be traced back to international 
differences in school systems. We use institutional features, notably choice, autonomy 
and accountability, that have been shown in education and growth to be associated with 
student achievement (see Woessmann, 2007).   
We then use two-stage least squares (2SLS) to estimate simultaneous equations 
for growth, cognitive skills and educational policy and by making identifying 
assumptions about the exogenous determinants of cognitive skills, educational policy 
and growth, we can determine the separate impacts of cognitive skills and educational 
policy on growth. Apart from identifying the causal effect by the use of instruments, 
our estimation strategy is to estimate how a country’s educational system affects 
economic growth for a given supportive institutional structure like choice, autonomy 
and accountability. So, we augment specification (1) by including the interaction terms 
between cognitive skill and the three different facets of school policy mentioned above. 
                                                          
10
 A variable is endogenous if it is correlated with the disturbance i.e. in this equation                    
                            is endogenous if                 is exogenous if           , OLS estimate will be 
consistent only if    [     ]   . (Wooldridge,2006).   
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This means we are able to test whether cognitive skills are affected by education policy 
or vice versa. The underlying idea is that the effect of a given educational policy is 
allowed to vary with quality human capital based on cognitive skills of the population.  
Suppose, for example, an education policy based on the institutional structures 
indicated above create quality education which enhances human capital into greater 
productivity then, the education policy would generate higher student output, which 
will eventually promote higher economic growth all else equal. In other words, a 
sufficient condition for policy on education that produces higher educational attainment 
is that they enhance the return to any given investment in the country. We would like to 
test this sufficient condition by interacting cognitive skills with the different school 
policies. This will give us the indication of whether school policy based on choice, 
autonomy and accountability, promotes economic growth.   
In this paper, our broad aim is, therefore, to capture the effects on growth of 
variations in cognitive skills, choice, autonomy and accountability, on their own, and 
also when cognitive skills interact in turn with the other three variables. The overall 
growth equation, taking all of these factors into account, can be expressed as follows: 
 
                                                                                        
                                                                             
                                                                                                                                 (2)                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                  
Based on this overall growth equation, one can calculate the marginal impacts of the 
following partial derivatives: 
 
          
         
                                                                          (2a)             
 
         
           
                                                                                                                               (3a)           
          
         
                 
                                                                                                                         (4a)        
          
         
                   
                                                                         (4b)                                                                                                
 
The above marginal partial derivatives give us the total (direct and indirect) effects of 
choice, autonomy, accountability and cognitive skills on growth. But although the final 
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objective is to find these partial derivatives for the most comprehensive of all cases, 
i.e., where all the nine β-coefficients (β0 to β8) are non-zero, we will also be interested 
in the cases where some of the β-coefficients are equal to zero. Our step-by-step 
procedure and analysis of results is presented in the section below. 
 
4. Results 
 
We start with an analysis of the fixed effects OLS (FE-OLS) on the impact of 
educational attainment on economic growth, because simple OLS specifications have 
only contemporaneous X variables (see Appendix Table 1).  
Table 2 shows the robustness of results using FE-OLS estimates that control for 
both country and year specific unobserved heterogeneity in our data. The point estimate 
on educational attainment remains strong and statistically highly significant. The 
inclusion of initial GDP per capita in all specifications simply reflects the condition of 
convergence, it suggests that any differences in growth rates will eventually die out. 
These results are consistent with past estimation where initial income negatively affects 
growth, supporting the notion of conditional convergence in growth rates. (See Barro, 
2001).  
Growth is insignificantly related to enrolment at the primary level. However, it is 
positively related to net enrolment at the secondary level. This we believe is more 
relevant for assessing the productive potential of a country and the welfare implications 
for the future of these students. This level of schooling is also a prerequisite for tertiary 
education and also the labour force and would, therefore, affect growth through this 
channel. There is little indication that this association differs across the decomposed 
levels of educational attainment, although the positive association of the individual 
levels of attainment, i.e., tertiary educational attainment (column (4)) seems to increase 
with a country’s growth level, measured by average growth rate on GDP 1980-2010 
have a much more pronounced effect on growth than the other types of attainment.  
 
5.1 Variations in Cognitive Skills Driven by School Structure: Instrumental 
Variable Models 
Even if the cognitive skills-growth relationship is causal, it is further important to 
remember that cognitive skills are likely to depend not only on formal schooling but 
also on non-school factors such as families, peers, and ability. The results presented so 
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far would only be relevant for school policy if the variation in cognitive skills 
emanating from school policies is in fact related to economic growth. 
One way of addressing this issue is to use measures of the institutional structure 
of the school systems as instruments for the cognitive-skill measure, thereby using only 
that part of the international variation in cognitive skills that can be traced back to 
international differences in school systems. We use educational institutional features 
such as the share of privately operated schools (choice), the localization of decision-
making  (autonomy), and the existence of external exit exam systems (accountability), 
that have been shown in the literature on quality of education in economic growth  to be 
associated with student achievement (see Woessmann, 2007). Table 3 shows these 
results. 
First in column (1) we can see that cognitive skills have a positive effect on 
economic growth, supporting Hanushek and Kimko’s results on the positive impact 
cognitive skills have on economic growth. A leading policy question refers to the 
effects of different educational policies on economic growth. We start by incorporating 
the different educational policies in our growth regression. 
School choice, as measured by the share of privately operated schools in a 
system, consistently shows a positive association with student achievement in OECD 
countries (see West and Woessmann, 2008). In our sample, the share of private 
enrolment in a country is significantly positively associated with cognitive skills in the 
first stage of our IV model (see Appendix Table 2). The second-stage estimate of the 
growth model, Table 3, confirms the results of the FE-OLS that schooling-induced 
differences in cognitive skills are significantly related to economic growth. The rule of 
thumb of a first stage F-statistic greater than 10 suggested by Stock, Wright, and Yogo 
(2002), however, indicates the possibility of a weak instrument problem. In our 
estimation, F-statistic is smaller than 10 suggesting our instruments are strong. The 
Sargan test does not reject the validity of the over identification restrictions suggesting 
that school choice is a valid instrument and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test presents no 
evidence of endogeneity of the cognitive skill measure. 
An institutional feature regularly shown to be positively associated with student 
achievement is the extent to which schools (or at least local decision-makers) are 
autonomous to make their own decisions about the organization of instruction (see 
Woessmann, 2003). Specification 3 of Table 3 shows that the share of decisions on the 
organization of instruction that are made at the local level is significantly positively 
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associated with our cognitive-skill measure, and the 2SLS estimator confirms the 
significantly positive effect of cognitive skills on economic growth. The results suggest 
that cognitive skills generated in an autonomous school system lead to higher long run 
growth of economies. Again, the Sargan test does not reject the validity of the over 
identification restrictions and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test presents no evidence of 
endogeneity of the cognitive-skill measure.  
A final institutional feature, external exit exam systems are a device to increase 
accountability in the school system that has been repeatedly shown to be related to 
better student achievement (see Bishop, 2006). The first specification reported in 
Appendix Table 2 uses the share of students in a country who are subject to external 
exit exams as an instrument for our measure of cognitive skills in the growth 
regression. The first-stage results confirm a statistically significant association between 
external exit exams and cognitive skills. The effect of cognitive skills on economic 
growth in the second stage of the instrumental variable (IV) estimation is statistically 
significant.  
One potential worry about the exogeneity of our instruments is that institutional 
features of school system may be correlated with other variables, which are themselves 
correlated with economic growth. To test whether this affects our identification, we add 
a variable that tends to enter most robustly in growth regressions, i.e., investment as a 
ratio of GDP, to our IV model (see Appendix Table 3). Our model is not affected, as 
the investment index variable does not enter significantly in any of the specifications
11
. 
There are obvious limitations of cross-country regressions with small data 
samples, and these are an issue in IV specifications. Nonetheless, the results of using 
the three institutional features of the school systems as instruments strongly suggest a 
causal interpretation of the results previously presented. Caution is appropriate in 
interpreting IV results for our relatively small samples of countries and the aggregate 
nature of the institutional measures, but these make the statistical significance, 
reasonable precision, and quantitative robustness of the results based on various 
instruments even more striking. 
In Table 4, we test the strength of the educational institutional measure variables 
of choice, autonomy and accountability, on economic growth. A simple FE-OLS 
regression with these variables at individual levels (columns (1)-(3), Table 4), show a 
                                                          
11
 However we did not estimate the pairwise correlation between the investment term and the institutional 
variables 
60 
 
positive association with economic growth after controlling for initial GDP per capita 
and year specific effects they are all consistently significant, both in magnitude and 
statistically. When all the variables were used in the same regression (column (4)), i.e., 
the case where              , the coefficient of the choice variable is 
significant but turns negative, which could be due to the existence of 
multicollinearity.
12
      In Table 5, we added cognitive skill to the three institutional 
variables: here all variables, remain positive and significant (the choice variable 
becomes highly significant), in column (4), where           ; the results 
change very little. Among the three institutional variables, autonomy and accountability 
seem to be more important than choice (with or without the presence of cognitive skills 
in the set-up). 
Understanding the sources of international variation in student achievement levels 
is an important project, all the more so because recent research shows that international 
differences in student achievement are a key driver of differences in long-run economic 
growth rates (Hanushek and Kimko, 2009). Economic theory suggests that strong 
education systems will increase the long-run rate of economic growth, because 
education is an investment in human capital that increases labour productivity. And 
because it is a leading input for innovation and technical progress, it in turn influences 
growth rates (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). 
Having looked at the strength of qualitative (via cognitive skills) and institutional 
(via choice, autonomy and accountability) variables separately in the growth regression, 
we now focus our attention to the role of cognitive skills in particular. In other words, 
we study how cognitive skills affect the growth outcome by itself, as well as via its 
interactions with each of the institutional variables. This is what we capture in Table 6, 
where cognitive skills is used as a regressor first, on its own, and then, as a term 
interacting with choice, autonomy and accountability. It is interesting to note from 
columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 6, where cognitive skills interacts with choice, 
autonomy and accountability in turn, that the interaction terms are always highly 
significant (at the 5% level), showing that cognitive skills thrive most in conjunction 
with the institutional variables, in particular when such schools have the autonomy and 
are accountable to others. It is also notable that in column (4), i.e., the case where 
          , where all the interaction terms are present in the same regression, 
                                                          
12
 Table A3 in the appendix show the OLS results. 
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all three remain significant (though at the 10% level). Also interesting is the fact that 
the effect of cognitive skills on growth, though positive, loses its significance in all but 
the first specification, thereby underlying the importance of its interaction with the 
three institutional variables. 
We next study the importance of the three institutional variables in the growth 
process by focusing on their individual effects on growth as well as via their interaction 
with the cognitive skills variable. The results of this exercise are shown in Table 7. It is 
clear from the regressions that when we consider each institutional variable on its own 
and its interaction with cognitive skills only (at the exclusion of the other two 
institutional variables), as is clear from specifications (1), (2) and (3), the individual 
and interaction terms are both highly significant, suggesting once more that the choice, 
autonomy and accountability variables are very important in the growth process. In 
column (4), where     , we find that only the autonomy and accountability terms (on 
their own) remain significant. 
We finally bring everything together in Table 8 by including cognitive skills and 
the three institutional variables (choice, autonomy and accountability) as separate 
regressors, and in addition capture the effects of the (choice*cognitive skills), 
(autonomy*cognitive skills) and (accountability*cognitive skills) interaction terms. As 
before, initial GDP per capita and the country FE are also included in all the 
regressions. The main finding here is that the coefficients of all the interaction 
terms a r e  consistently positive and h i g h l y  significant in all the regressions. The 
positive and significant coefficients suggest that better institutional structure of school 
systems will, in fact, enhance the positive growth effects of cognitive skills even after 
controlling for a variety of policy-related variables. Correspondingly, it could be 
interpreted as suggesting that the effectiveness of educational structure in encouraging 
growth is increasing in cognitive skills.   
For example the interaction variable that links choice and cognitive skills is to 
test if privately operated schools affect the impact of cognitive skills on growth (see 
Table 8, column (1)). The estimate for cognitive skills and the interaction term are 
significant, implying that the complementarity between cognitive skills and choice 
suggests that economic returns comes from policies that effectively improve student 
achievement  and thus add to the skills of the labour force. In such systems, privately 
operated schools face particularly strong incentives to perform well. Another question 
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that we attempt to address is how autonomy influences the impact cognitive skills have 
on economic growth.  
Results in Table 8, column (2), shed light on this question. The results suggest 
that the effects of school autonomy on student achievement depend on whether schools 
are able to manage their budgets and curriculum. The coefficient of cognitive skills, 
autonomy and the interaction term is significant, which means autonomy-based systems 
may function better if cognitive skills systems create comparable information on 
economic growth. 
Finally, the interactions between the effects of cognitive skills and accountability 
(Table 8, column (3)), may be expected at the system level. Accountability and 
cognitive skills seem to be complementary in any decision-making area that includes 
scope for local knowledge leads. However, when we include all seven variables (i.e., 
cognitive skills, choice, autonomy, accountability, and the three interaction terms) in 
the same regression, most of the terms become insignificant (Table 8, column (4), 
where all β-coefficients are non-zero). This is likely due to possible multicollinearity 
among the institutional variables when they are included in the same regression.  
Overall, Table 8 supports our hypothesis that for OECD countries to benefit (in 
terms of higher growth) from human capital in the form of education, school policy 
should pay more attention to the quality of education by putting in place a system 
where the institutional structure  provides incentives to the operators of the education 
system, because performance  responds to incentives. This is evident from the fact that 
in all the regressions (unless all the variables are included together), cognitive skills 
have a positive effect on growth on their own as well as through their interaction with 
the institutional variables. 
Finally, we look at the marginal (i.e., both direct and indirect) effects of skills and 
institutions on growth, because the implications of the results become clearer if one 
looks at the marginal impacts of cognitive skills and institutional structures, 
respectively, on annual economic growth.  As far as regressions, (1), (2) and (3) in 
Table 8 are concerned, all the marginal partial effects are positive; thus the marginal 
contributions of choice, autonomy, accountability and cognitive skills to long-run 
growth (both direct and indirect) are unambiguously positive, which is along expected 
lines. However, when we consider regression (4) in Table 8, only the           
           
 and the  
         
                 
 marginal effects are positive (and equal 3.395 and 3.586, respectively), 
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while the others turn out to be zero, but this is because when all eight variables plus the 
constant term are included in the same regression, many of the coefficients turn out to 
be insignificant, as noted earlier. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Most research on the human capital component of growth is concentrated on the 
accumulation of more education. The common approach to estimating this kind of 
model is to relate changes in GDP per worker to changes in the quantity of education. 
Quality of education is measured by the knowledge that students gain as depicted in the 
acquiring of cognitive skills, and this is substantially more important for economic 
growth than the mere quantity of education. 
This research provides evidence on whether or not students perform better in school 
systems that have various forms of choice, autonomy and accountability policies in 
place relative to systems that do not. We also focus on how these three factors interact 
with cognitive skills to determine economic growth.  
This paper empirically assesses the impact that cognitive skills and institutional 
characteristics have on the economic growth and their interactive effects in 25 OECD 
countries. The results show that interaction effects of cognitive skills and institutional 
structures have a significant impact on economic growth. The results remain robust 
under alternative panel estimations. In particular, the marginal contributions of 
cognitive skills, choice, autonomy and accountability to long-run growth (both direct 
and indirect) are unambiguously positive in almost all the regressions. The results also 
reflect that economic growth accelerates the process of cognitive skills in the presence 
of good institutions, therefore economic growth is vital in increasing good institutions. 
One could provide a more detailed interpretation of alternative educational policies in 
the context of this model of quality versus quantity, although our main point in this 
discussion was to show that public support to education needs to be adequately 
designed and channelled in order to be unambiguously growth-enhancing. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1:  Descriptive statistics 
variable observation mean Standard 
deviation 
min max 
Average annual growth rate in GDP 1980-
2010 
175 3.7 2.9 1 9.2 
Cognitive skills 174 4.9 0.2 4.6 4.9 
Average year of total education 175 9.6 1.8 4.7 13.27 
Average Year of Primary Schooling 175 5.5 1.03 3.5 7.9 
Average year of secondary schooling 175 3.4 1.2 0.85 7.8 
Average year of tertiary schooling 175 0.62 0.33 0.1 1.7 
choice 175 0.2 0.2 0.01 0.8 
autonomy 175 0.5 0.2 0.13 0.9 
accountability 175 0.6 0.4 0 1 
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Table 2 FE-OLS estimates of educational attainment and economic growth 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES growth growth growth growth growth growth 
       
Initial GDP  -0.095* -0.041 -0.079 -0.140** -0.0049 -0.068 
per capita (0.055) 
 
(0.056) (0.055) (0.061) (0.060) (0.064) 
Total educational 0.645**      
Attainment 
 
(0.258)      
Primary   1.783*     
Educational attainment 
 
 (0.933)     
Secondary educational   0.821**    
Attainment 
 
  (0.386)    
Tertiary educational    4.676***   
Attainment 
 
   (1.46)   
Net primary      0.034  
Enrolment rate 
 
    (0.062)  
Net secondary       0.128*** 
Enrolment rate      (0.040) 
 
Constant -2.32 -6.10 1.01 1.072 0.431 -7.28** 
 (2.45) (5.14) (1.30) (0.88) (5.95) (3.46) 
       
Observations 175 175 175 175 171 165 
R-squared 0.103 0.036 0.089 0.151 0.002 0.107 
 
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3 Instrumental Variable Estimates 
FE-OLS estimate of cognitive skills on economic 
growth 
Instrumental Variable Estimate 
 
Second stage IV estimate of cognitive skills on economic growth 
            
        (1)    (2) (3) (4) 
 Growth  Growth 
(choice)  
Growth 
(autonomy) 
 
Growth 
(accountability) 
variables  variables    
Initial GDP per capita -0.642 
(0.580) 
Initial GDP per 
capita 
-0.201    
(0.887)     
-1.290   
(0.161)      
-2.147 
  (0.135)       
Cognitive skills 0.852** 
(0.311)  
Cognitive skills 2.068**   
(0.306)     
1.062 *** 
(0.055)        
2.862 ***   
(0.117)      
constant 3.153 
(14.58) 
constant 13.65*** 
(0.018)  
12.72  
(0.632)       
9.85   
(0.258)       
observations 174  174 174 174 
Number of countries 25     
R-squared 0.068  0.450 0.558 0.260 
F-test   1.2 6.18 5.13 
 
 
Notes dependent variable of FE-OLS and of second stage is the average annual growth rate of GDP per capita 1980-
2010 the variables in parenthesis is variable which are used as instruments. 
Notes column (1): Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
           Notes column (2): Sargan statistic (over identification test of all instruments):  0.244 Chi-sq(1) P-val = 0.6213 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% maximal IV size 19.93 
Tests of endogeneity of: cognitive skills 
H0: Regressor is exogenous 
Wu-Hausman F test: 1.21313  F(1,163)    P-value = 0.27234 
 Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: 1.23372  Chi-sq(1)   P-value = 0.26668 
Notes column (3): Sargan statistic (over identification test of all instruments):  0.640 Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.4237  
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% maximal IV size 19.93  
Tests of endogeneity of: cognitive skills 
H0: Regressor is exogenous 
Wu-Hausman F test:                  6.18956  F(1,163)    P-value = 0.01386 
 Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test:      6.10946  Chi-sq(1)   P-value = 0.0134 
Notes column (4): Sargan statistic (over identification test of all instruments): 0.541 Chi-sq(1) P-val =0.4621 
 Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% maximal IV size 19.93 
Tests of endogeneity of: cognitive skills 
H0: Regressor is exogenous 
Wu-Hausman F test:                  5.13277  F(1,163)    P-value = 0.02479 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test:      5.09819  Chi-sq(1)   P-value = 0.02395 
 
67 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 FE-OLS estimates for the role of education policy based on  choice, accountability and autonomy on 
economic growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES growth growth growth growth 
     
Initial GDP per capita -0.012 -0.017 -0.124** -0.122* 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.059) 
 
Choice 0.291*   -0.319** 
 (0.164)   (0.151) 
 
Autonomy  4.883***  3.008** 
  (1.643)  (1.312) 
 
Accountability   4.057** 3.917** 
   (1.62) (1.768) 
 
Constant 3.064*** -22.72** -21.35** -36.07*** 
 (3.741) (8.88) (10.05) (10.58) 
     
Observations 168 168 168 168 
R-squared 0.004 0.024 0.101 0.109 
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
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Table 5: FE-OLS estimates for the role of education policy based on  choice, accountability and autonomy on 
economic growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES growth growth growth growth 
     
Initial GDP per capita -0.0642 -0.0708 -0.1618*** -0.1601** 
 (0.0589) (0.0586) (0.0575) (0.0584) 
 
Cognitive skills 0.0790** 0.0812** 0.0670* 0.0689** 
 (0.0317) 
 
(0.0308) (0.0327) (0.0330) 
Choice 3.416*   -2.558 
 (1.751)   (1.600) 
 
Autonomy  5.089***  3.198** 
  (1.357)  (1.314) 
 
Accountability   3.785** 3.573* 
   (1.653) (1.817) 
 
Constant -0.8106 -27.62*** -22.99** -38.45*** 
 (1.542) (7.269) (9.570) (9.955) 
     
Observations 167 167 167 167 
R-squared 0.060 0.082 0.147 0.155 
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table  6: FE-OLS estimates for the role of education policy based on choice, accountability and autonomy on 
economic growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES growth growth growth growth 
     
Initial GDP per capita -0.708*** -0.551* -0.713** -0.702** 
 (0.000) 
 
(0.060) (0.057) (0.058) 
Cognitive skills 0.606* 0.0410 0.0196 0.171 
 (0.351) 
 
(0.678) (0.613) (0.711) 
Choice*Cognitive skills 0.932**   0.688* 
 (0.022) 
 
  (0.058) 
Autonomy*Cognitive skills  1.642**  0.782* 
  (.005) 
 
 (.062) 
Accountability*Cognitive skills   1.063** 0.605* 
   (0.023) 
 
(0.093) 
Constant 1.746 5.045 3.676 1.420 
 (13.63) (13.45) (15.07) (15.13) 
     
Observations 167 167 167 167 
R-squared 0.065 0.065 0.068 0.075 
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table  7: FE-OLS estimates for the role of education policy based on  choice, accountability and autonomy on 
economic growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES growth growth growth growth 
     
Initial GDP per capita -0.625 -0.616 -1.601** -1.683** 
 (0.618) (0.581) (0.592) (0.670) 
Choice -6.828**   -8.791 
 (3.245)   (5.448) 
Choice*Cognitive skills 2.419***   1.379 
 (0.634)   (1.180) 
Autonomy  4.601***  3.433** 
  (1.372)  (1.226) 
Autonomy*Cognitive skills  1.569***  0.643 
  (0.484)  (1.001) 
Accountability   3.579** 3.566* 
   (1.705) (1.881) 
Accountability*Cognitive skills   0.864** 0.141 
   (0.374) (0.738) 
Constant 26.21*** -25.31*** -21.14** -38.64*** 
 (3.605) (71.68) (99.28) (99.48) 
     
Observations 167 167 167 167 
R-squared 0.050 0.087 0.148 0.168 
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table  8: FE-OLS estimates for the role of education policy based on  choice, accountability and autonomy on 
economic growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES growth growth growth growth 
     
Initial GDP per capita -0.558 -0.562 -1.543** -1.624** 
 (0.661) (0.617) (0.639) (0.732) 
Cognitive kills 11.50 10.72 11.26 9.950 
 (28.26) (28.20) (24.13) (25.59) 
Choice -6.065*   -8.384 
 (3.409)   (5.742) 
Choice*Cognitive skills 2.254***   1.303 
 (0.666)   (1.225) 
Autonomy  4.655***  3.395** 
  (1.367)  (1.244) 
Autonomy*Cognitive skills  1.488***  0.650 
  (0.496)  (1.046) 
Accountability   3.613** 3.586* 
   (1.708) (1.889) 
Accountability*Cognitive skills   0.800** 0.100 
   (0.377) (0.788) 
Constant -31.15 -30.73** -26.78* -43.43*** 
 (14.16) (14.29) (13.70) (13.01) 
     
Observations 167 167 167 167 
R-squared 0.055 0.092 0.153 0.172 
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 OLS estimate of educational attainment and economic growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES growth growth growth growth growth growth 
       
Initial GDP per -0.782 -0.381 -0.490 -1.033 -0.261 -0.801 
Capita 
 
(0.691) (0.681) (0.719) (0.690) (0.713) (0.714) 
Total  4.416***      
Educational attainment 
 
(1.388)      
primary  8.562**     
Educational attainment 
 
 (3.453)     
Secondary    2.823    
Educational attainment 
 
  (1.974)    
tertiary    31.02***   
Educational attainment 
 
   (7.972)   
Net Primary      0.398  
Enrolment rate 
 
    (0.538)  
Net secondary      1.120*** 
Enrolment rate 
 
     (0.286) 
Constant -4.012 -9.688 28.20*** 19.77*** -0.564 -57.89** 
 (13.70) (19.43) (7.520) (6.271) (51.84) (24.79) 
       
Observations 175 175 175 175 171 165 
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2 first stage IV regression 
First-stage regressions 
 
variables Cognitive skills Cognitive skills Cognitive skills 
Initial GDP per capita 0.413    
(0.142) 
  0.431  
(0.287)       
0.385   
(0.169)     
Choice  5.453   
(0.094) **      
  
autonomy  2.045  
(0.000) ***      
 
accountability   4.005    
(0.021) **      
constant 4.715  
(0.000) ***       
2.888  
(0.000) ***        
4.394   
(0.000) ***      
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TABLE A3 FE-OLS with interaction terms with cognitive skills 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES growth growth growth 
    
Initial GDP per capita -2.081*** -2.247*** -2.340*** 
 (0.561) (0.558) (0.580) 
 
investment 0.452 0.493 0.472 
 (0.536) (0.525) (0.536) 
 
Cognitive skills 10.87 6.794 6.410 
 (19.86) (21.14) (20.81) 
 
Choice*cognitive skills 0.799***   
       (0.004)  
 
  
Autonomy*cognitive  1.141**  
  (0.033) 
 
 
Accountability*cognitive skills   0.798** 
   (0.044) 
 
 
Constant -102.5 -100.7 -94.11 
 (99.76) (106.1) (104.0) 
    
Observations 167 167 167 
 
R-squared 0.253 0.275 0.278 
 
Number of countries 25 25 25 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A4 OLS estimates for the role of education policy based on choice accountability and autonomy on 
economic growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES growth growth growth growth 
     
Initial GDP per capita -0.216 -0.211 -0.306 -0.228 
 (0.695) (0.690) (0.690) (0.693) 
choice -7.128   -12.37 
 (16.91)   (17.73) 
autonomy  26.04  19.38 
  (18.69)  (21.97) 
accountability   13.97 11.03 
   (10.08) (11.63) 
Constant 38.60*** 22.98** 28.56*** 22.39* 
 (5.702) (11.08) (7.640) (11.95) 
     
Observations 168 168 168 168 
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A5 OLS estimates for the role of education policy based on choice accountability and autonomy on 
economic growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES growth growth growth growth 
     
Initial GDP per capita -0.548 -0.505 -0.613 -0.557 
 (0.686) (0.696) (0.686) (0.696) 
Cognitive skills 0.524** 0.410 0.468* 0.446* 
 (0.252) (0.259) (0.251) (0.259) 
choice -7.174   -12.43 
 (17.06)   (16.73) 
autonomy  16.20  7.226 
  (18.25)  (21.15) 
accountability   13.30 12.89 
   (9.873) (10.91) 
Constant 13.38 8.576 6.421 6.373 
 (13.15) (14.32) (13.58) (14.87) 
     
Observations 167 167 167 167 
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A6 OLS estimates for the role of education policy based on choice accountability and autonomy on 
economic growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES growth growth growth growth 
     
Initial GDP per capital -0.299 -0.375 -0.557 -0.507 
 (0.685) (0.672) (0.679) (0.683) 
Cognitive skills 6.419 -0.0762 -0.916 -1.538 
 (12.05) (12.11) (11.84) (12.22) 
Choice*cognitive skills 0.150   -0.144 
 (0.334)   (0.338) 
Autonomy*cognitive skills  0.611**  0.320 
  (0.288)  (0.342) 
Accountability*cognitive skills   0.443** 0.367* 
   (0.174) (0.216) 
Constant 3.252 20.75 28.19 26.36 
 (5.969) (5.889) (5.821) (5.918) 
     
Observations 167 167 167 167 
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Tables of Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Data Source Mean(standard 
deviation) 
Dependent variable 
Average annual growth 
rate in GDP 1980-2010 
Penn World Table Version 7.0, (Heston et al., 2010) 3.7(2.9) 
Cognitive skills Hanushek and Kimko (2000) combined data from international tests given over the past 
45 years in order to develop a single comparable measure of skills for each country that 
can be used to index skills of people in the labour force. 
4.98 (0.22)       
Independent variable 
Average year of total 
education 
Barro and Lee, Educational attainment for total population,1980-2010 9.64(1.82) 
Independent variable 
Average Year of 
Primary Schooling 
Barro and Lee, Educational attainment for total population,1980-2010 5.54(1.03) 
Independent variable 
Average year of 
secondary schooling 
Barro and Lee, Educational attainment for total population,1980-2010 3.47(1.23)        
Independent variable 
Average year of tertiary 
schooling 
Barro and Lee, Educational attainment for total population,1980-2010 0.62(0.33)       
Independent variable Net 
enrolment rate for 
primary schools, 1980-
2010 
UNESCO Annual Statistics 96.29(4.5) 
Independent variable Net 
enrolment rate for 
secondary schools, 
1980-201 
UNESCO Annual Statistics 86.70(8.4) 
Independent variable 
Choice 
The measure of school choice is taken from the school background questionnaires of the 
PISA tests. compiled by Aghion (2007) and West and Woessmann (2010) 
0.21(0.23)         
Independent variable 
Autonomy 
The measure of autonomy is taken from the school background questionnaires of PISA 
tests, compiled by Aghion (2007) and West and Woessmann (2010) 
0.54(0.22)       
Independent variable 
Accountability 
The measure of school accountability is taken from the school background 
questionnaires of PISA tests, compiled by Aghion (2007) and West and Woessmann  
0.62 (0.42)           
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Figure 1: cognitive skills and growth across OECD countries 
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Figure 2: the interaction effect of cognitive skills and the different school policies on OECD growth 
rate 
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Figure 3: the interaction effect of cognitive skills and the different school policies on OECD growth 
rate 
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Figure 4: the interaction effect of cognitive skills and the different school policies on OECD growth 
rate 
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Political Economy Analysis of Allocation of Public School resources: Evidence 
from Indian Districts 
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A political economy analysis of allocation of public school resources: evidence 
from Indian districts 
 
Abstract: School budget is a significant proportion of GDP in most developing 
countries as many of them tend to follow an input-based approach to boost literacy.  
While public provision of schooling has commonly been perceived as uniform and 
egalitarian, recent studies highlight the bias in the incidence of public spending, 
especially in developing countries (World Bank 2003). In this context, the present 
paper examines the allocation of public school resources in Indian districts that 
remains little understood. One reckons that the strength of India’s democracy would 
ensure a fairer allocation of educational spending/allocation school inputs; this is 
because it is difficult for a democratically elected government to be unresponsive to the 
needs of their electorate, especially when the latter are well informed and politically 
aware, (Clots-Figueras, I 2012). Results using a unique district-level panel data for 
1992-2002 tend to highlight the inadequate allocation of public school funds. Ceteris 
paribus, we find that greater voter turnout is associated with significantly greater share 
of public schools and lower pupil teacher ratio at primary and upper-primary levels of 
schooling while larger district with more elected legislators significantly boost 
infrastructural facilities in government’s schools in the district. However, politician’s 
gender and caste have limited or no effect on the allocation of any public school 
resources in our sample.  
 
JEL classification: H4; D70; H19; I2; O10 
Keywords: Education, public school resources, voter participation, gender, caste of 
legislators, district size, India 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Eight out of ten of the world's children live in developing countries where educational 
attainment is typically lower than that in the developed world. This in turn makes 
investment in education a policy priority for economic growth and poverty alleviation, 
as has been pushed forward in the adoption of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
by the UN (e.g., see Becker 1995; Hanushek 1995; UNDP 1990; World Bank 2001). 
School budget is a significant proportion of GDP in most developing countries and 
many low-income countries tend to follow an input-based approach to boost literacy. 
Public provision of goods and services has commonly been perceived as uniform and 
egalitarian and has therefore been defended on normative grounds. In fact, universal 
public provision has been viewed as the main vehicle to achieving the equity goals in 
the economy (see Tawney [1952]).  
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In an important work, Le Grand (1982), however, documents that the actual 
incidence of public spending may be highly skewed in favour of more influential 
population groups, arguing that the middle class and the rich turn out to be the primary 
beneficiaries in many areas of public intervention in the UK including public 
investment in education, health, housing and transportation. This bias in the incidence 
of public spending is even more significant in developing countries; for example, 
Reinikka and Svensson (2004) found that in Uganda socioeconomic endowment 
matters, and schools use their bargaining power to secure greater shares of government 
funding.  
A World Bank (2003) report that children from poor households have much less 
access to schooling at progressively higher levels than children from  richer families, 
and their attrition rates increase with the grade (see World Bank 2003, Chapters 2 and 
7).
13
 In this context, the present study specifically examines the factors determining the 
allocation of public school inputs in Indian districts, which remains little understood. 
India is an important case in point. The country’s overall success story hides striking 
inter and intra-state variation in literacy rates. The government’s flagship programme 
Sarva Shiksha Abhiyyan (SSA) launched in the new Millennium emphasizes huge 
spending of school infrastructure and teacher training. Annual Report of the Education 
Department of Government of India claims that the programme has been very 
successful to significantly increase the number of new schools, appointment of new 
teachers, construction of building and additional class room, facilities for access to 
drinking water and toilet in the school premises; however Rs 100.000 crore extra 
spending on these programmes fails to boost learning outcomes significantly in last five 
years. The Annual Status of Education Report (ASER 2011) reveals that the proportion 
of class 5 children able to read a class 2 text has fallen from 53.7% in 2010 to 48.2% in 
2011. In the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) international 
competition for children’s learning, India came 72nd out of 73 countries. These 
observations would naturally question the effectiveness of the distribution of public 
school inputs to all regions and to all sections of the community. This is because the 
effect of school inputs on school outcomes would not only depend on improving the 
                                                          
13
 Considering  the distribution of public spending on education for 21 developing economies, WB 
(2003) found that the median incidence of spending on education on the poorest quintiles is about 14 
percent (the minimal is 7percent); for some countries public education spending on the top quintile is 
three and more times that on the bottom quintile. Moreover, this bias closely mirrors the skewness of 
income distribution in the sample countries. 
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supply of school inputs, but also in ensuring that the additional resources are utilised 
effectively by all those who are lagging behind.  
One reckons that the strength of India’s democracy should ensure a fairer 
allocation of educational spending/allocation school inputs; this is because it is difficult 
for a democratically elected government to be unresponsive to the needs of their 
electorate, especially when the latter are well informed and politically aware (Clots-
Figueras, I 2012). 
 Given that the Indian districts have education offices, politicians in the state 
governments could keep in close contact with these offices, and could influence the 
way expenditures are made there. They could also decide to transfer more funds to 
preferred district, e.g., if it pertains to their own constituencies. Following the recent 
political economy literature, our analysis highlights the role of voter’s turnout 
(Betancourt and Gleason, 2000), gender/caste of elected legislators (Pande, 2003; Duflo 
and Chattopadhyay, 2004) and also the number of elected legislators in a district on the 
allocation of public school resources in Indian districts.  
Recent study by Fujiwara (2011) showed that enhanced political participation of 
less educated voters in Brazil shifted government spending towards health care, a 
policy that is particularly beneficial to the poor, leading to improved health service 
utilization (pre-natal visits) by less educated mothers and lower prevalence of low 
weight births in this group. Now turning our attention to the allocation of public school 
resources (and not the overall public services per se), we argue that the greater political 
participation among voters in a district is likely to induce elected legislators to improve 
the tax-funded public service delivery in the locality, which among others would 
include the distribution of public school inputs. This is because greater voter turnout 
highlights constituents’ awareness of the local issues including schooling outcome 
determining their children future productivity and earnings, which will be hard to 
avoid, especially if the elected members want to be re-elected. If voter turnout has no 
effect on these allocations, it can be interpreted as evidence that the voice mechanism 
fails and the state level decision makers do not respond to their electorate’s preferences. 
This forms the basis of our first hypothesis. 
Our second hypothesis focuses on the effect of gender and caste of the local 
legislators on the allocation of public school inputs. Given that political institutions 
play a major role in providing education and are led by people of different political 
persuasions, it is important to understand whether gender/caste characteristics of 
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elected legislators would influence the policies they choose. Downs (1957) argued that 
political decisions should only reflect the preferences of the electorate, if candidates 
could commit to implement specific policies when elected and only cared about 
winning the elections. If this were the case, female political representation would not 
matter for policy outcomes, because equilibrium policies would follow the preferences 
of the median voter. Thus, as long as women could vote in the elections, their 
preferences would be represented by the candidate elected, irrespective of the gender of 
the candidate. The same would apply to politicians belonging to a given caste. 
However, Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996) show how in the 
absence of complete policy commitment, the identity of the legislator matters for policy 
determination, as increasing political representation of a group would increase its 
influence in policy. Further following Lott and Kenny (1999), one can argue that 
women and low caste legislators generally have lower incomes than the general 
population and are over-represented in Indian poverty estimates; as such, it is likely that 
they would benefit more from the redistributive public spending (including education 
spending), and may thus lobby for such spending. Thus, our second hypothesis is that 
the female and low castes of legislators are likely to boost access to various public 
school resources in their constituencies as this would help their cohorts.  
 Finally, we argue that the responsiveness of the political system to a district’s 
concerns may be influenced by the number of representatives a district has, which is 
determined by the number of constituencies within a district. Because constituencies 
are based on population, more urbanized districts tend to have more constituencies. 
Hence, the significance of this variable would indicate a bias in the allocation 
mechanisms. In this respect, it is also interesting to assess whether the female and low 
caste MLAs are more effective to improve public school resources, when they are in a 
districts with more constituencies. In the absence of a prior, we use our data to explore 
the nature of the relationship in this respect. Clearly this is not an exhaustive list of all 
possible political economy factors that may influence allocation of public school 
resources and we acknowledge that there may be factors like political competition that 
we have not controlled for. We particularly choose these variables as the voters (rather 
than politicians) can directly influence these factors and as such results from our 
analysis could yield important implications for future policies. 
Our analysis has been facilitated by the access to unique district-level data for 
1992 and 2002 that we compile from various official sources including Population 
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Census (1991 and 2001), All India School Education Survey (1992 and 2002) and also 
National Sample Survey (NSS). The district is the best unit of analysis because it 
allows us to estimate the effect of the gender of the politicians in the lowest possible 
administrative area where their electoral constituency is located. Moreover, given that 
the Indian districts are the lower level of administration and have educational offices; 
legislators in a particular district could also direct funds to these offices, having an 
effect not only on their constituencies but also on the overall district.  
We consider a number of public school resources for our analysis.  Access to 
school is often voted as a barrier to universal education. Schooling may be worse when 
pupils per teacher are high since teachers are the single most important factor for 
improving student attainment (Hanushek et al. 2005). Consistent exposure to effective 
teachers can overcome the obstacles to learning and may even close the learning gap. 
Accordingly, we not only consider the determinants of shares of government schools in 
a district, but also some indices of quality of schools as reflected in pupils per teacher 
(PTR) ratio at primary, upper secondary, secondary schools. Access to various physical 
infrastructures is also shown to be important determinants of school attendance and 
attainment; hence, we consider the shares of government schools with access to 
drinking water, pucca building, and toilet for girls.  
Since we have access to two-years panel data for each of the districts drawn from 
17 major states of India, we use district fixed effects estimates that allows us to exploit 
the variation in the outcome variables over the years for a given district to identify a 
causal effect of turnout and legislator characteristics on district’s access to various 
public school resources. In doing so, we try our best to minimise the omitted variable 
bias and also control for unobserved district and year-level trends so as to identify the 
true effects of voter turnout and legislator characteristics on selected public school 
resources which have important bearing on student performance.   
Results from our analysis contribute to a growing literature on the provision of 
publicly provided goods as well as allocation of public spending on different accounts 
at national/subnational levels in developing countries, especially India. Pande (2003) 
analyses how the reservation of seats for SC/STs in the State Assemblies increases the 
transfers that these groups receive. Besley et al (2004) study the effect of reservations 
for SC/STs in village councils on the public goods that lower castes receive. Bardhan et 
al (2010) examine the effect of reservations of Panchayat Pradhans on targeting to poor 
and SC/ST households. Bardhan et al, find that the village councils with a leader from 
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the scheduled castes (SC) or scheduled tribes (ST) tend to receive more credit from the 
Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP). Regarding the role of women 
leaders,  Chattopadhay and Duflo (2004) show how the reservation of one-third of the 
seats for women in Panchayats (local rural self-government) in the states of West 
Bengal and Rajasthan has a positive effect on investment in infrastructure relevant to 
women’s needs. Clots-Figueras (2012) showed that increasing female political 
participation has a significant positive effect on primary education in urban areas by 6 
percentage points, which is 21% of the difference in primary education attainment 
between the richest and the poorest Indian states. Pal and Ghosh (2012), however, 
distinguish dominant (landed or capitalist) elite from minority elite like women and low 
caste legislators and find that the presence of low caste and female legislators in 
parliament do not necessarily have a significant impact on state education spending. 
Finally, an electoral system based on constituencies coupled with an administration 
system based on districts seems to generate urban bias in allocation of publicly 
provided goods to rural households in India see Betancourt and Gleason 2000. 
Our point of departure is to examine if the selected arguments, namely, voter 
turnout, gender and caste of elected legislators and also number of constituencies per 
district can explain the allocation of public school resources in Indian districts. Ceteris 
paribus, there is evidence from our analysis that greater turnout significantly boost 
shares of government schools (in total schools) and also their access to some physical 
infrastructure e.g., pucca buildings and lowers pupils per teacher ratio (PTR) at various 
levels of schooling. In contrast, we find that the gender/caste of the elected legislators 
have rather limited effects in our sample: greater share of low caste legislators may 
boost certain public school resources only if voter turnout is higher while we do not 
find any significant role of female legislators. There is further suggestion that rural and 
poorer districts tend to have lower share of public schools in total schools which raises 
concerns about access to schools in these regions. There is no evidence that ethnically 
fractionalised districts have less public schools, rather there is evidence that these 
districts tend to have higher share of public schools with drinking water. In other 
words, the current process of allocation of public school resources seems to be 
inadequate as it may not help securing ‘education for all’; rather the process seems to 
serve those better who live in larger districts with more elected legislators to represent 
their interests and where voters are more politically aware thus contributing to higher 
turnout.  
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These findings have important implications for future policy. Access to school is 
often voted as a barrier to universal education. Schooling may be worse when pupils 
per teacher are high and/or there are poor physical infrastructural facilities. In addition 
to secure funds for better school inputs (both teaching and non-teaching), there is 
clearly a need to ensure a better allocation of these resources so that funds reach those 
who need them most – poorer districts, rural regions and also ethnically diverse regions. 
Further efforts can be made to encourage voter turnout so that voters can vote securely 
and peacefully without being influenced.  
The rest of the paper is as follows section 2 explains the data used. Section 3 explains 
the methodology, section 4 shows the results obtained and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data  
 
The empirical analysis focuses on examining what determines the allocation of public 
school resources in Indian districts, using data compiled from various official sources. 
In this section we explain the process of data generation, its shortcomings and also 
describe the data at our disposal. 
 
2.1 Data generation 
To answer our central queries, we collected Data from various sources: This includes 
All India School Education Survey (AISES) data 1992-93 (6
th
) and 2002-03 (7
th
) and 
Census data (1991 and 2001) and National Sample Surveys (93-94 and 2004-05 
rounds). District-level AISES data cover information on recognised government 
schools characteristics including those relating to gender/caste of teachers, access to 
physical facilities (nature of school building, access to drinking water, lavatory within 
the school premises) at primary, upper primary and secondary levels of schooling.
14
 
1991 and 2001 district-level Census data provide information on population 
composition (classified by gender/caste) and literacy rates for different age categories 
of the population (male/female and total), and access to various infrastructural facilities 
which is important for our analysis. We also get information on mean per capital 
monthly expenditure and poverty measures from the relevant NSS rounds (1992-93 and 
1999-00). 
                                                          
14
 Note that our analysis does not include the case of government aided schools. 
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 Clearly, the data collection for the analysis in the paper was intensive and 
required us to carefully match different parts of the data painstakingly. First, we 
collected district level data from the 6
th
 and 7
th
 AISES surveys conducted in 1992 and 
2002 for 16 major states of India. In this respect, we followed the 1991 Census district 
convention and specifically included the districts whose boundaries did not change over 
the decade 1992-2002 so that the sample districts are comparable in our sample. Note 
that in 2000 three of the sample states, namely, Bihar, UP and MP were split to create 
new states of Jharkhand, Uttaranchal and Chhatisgarh; the latter required some districts 
which were in these original states in 1991 to be allocated to the newly created states by 
2002. However for our purpose, these districts were still allocated to the original states 
namely Bihar, MP and Rajasthan as this partition was only enacted at the turn of the 
Millennium. This generated district-level information from AISES, Census and NSS for 
each of two years 1992 and 2002. 
We next consider assembly constituency level data available from the Election 
Commission of India (ECI). While the lowest unit of administration is the district, the 
basic unit of the electoral process is the constituency in India. The latter is defined in 
terms of population and at a much lower level of aggregation than the district. Since our 
analysis focuses on school resources, we make use of assembly election data for the 
relevant years for the sample states. The boundaries of assembly constituencies are 
drawn to make sure that there are approximately the same number of inhabitants in 
each constituency. The assemblies vary in size according to state population. A very 
detailed dataset was collected on the elections held by the State Legislatures in India 
during 1990-2002, Since different states have elections in different years, we carefully 
go through the PDF reports published by the ECI with a view to closely match the 
election years with the two AISES survey years 1992 and 2002.  
The ECI provides information at the constituency level of the candidate who won, 
whether he contested in a SC/ST reserved constituency, his or her gender and political 
party. It also provides data on all female candidates who contested for election, their 
political parties and the votes they obtained. For female and male politicians who won 
against a candidate of the other gender, the information was gathered regarding the 
runner-up in each particular election and regarding the votes obtained by him/her. This 
data was painstakingly inputted. This generates the constituency-level election data for 
the sample districts for the years around 1992 and 2002 since different states have 
elections in different years. 
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Finally we need to match the district-level data from AISES and NSS with the 
election information available from the ECI. This is done as follows. First, we consult 
different constituency delimitation orders and the publications “State Elections in 
India” (which lists the constituencies that are included in each district in each election 
year) to find out whether some districts have been divided, have been newly created or 
have disappeared during any election year during the sample period 1990-2002. There 
are about 463 districts in 16 major states in India. Considering the districts that did not 
split or disappear, this leads to a choice of 361 districts for each of the sample years 
1992 and 2002 (Kumar and Somanathan, 2009). Finally, we follow Bose and Singh 
(1988) to match the sample constituencies with the sample districts selected as above, 
which gives rise to about 3000 constituencies from these 361 districts for each of the 
sample years. Similar procedure has been followed by Clots-Figueras (2012). Once we 
identify the districts in which the constituencies are located, we generate the district 
level average voter turnout, voting difference between winners and losers, share of  
female and low caste (SC/ST) legislators in total assembly seats.  Which are then 
matched with the district-level AISES Census and NSS information. 
In particular, 1992 AISES data has been matched with 1991 Census data, 1993-94 
NSS data and aggregated district-level election information (both Parliamentary and 
Assembly elections) for 1991 for most states. Similarly, 2002 AISES data has been 
matched with 2001 Census data, 1999 NSS data and 1999 district level election 
information for most states in our sample. Appendix Table A1 describes the source of 
each of the regression variables and also their respective means and standard 
deviations. This allows us to build up a two-period panel data for the period 1992-2002. 
Construction of two-period district-level data allow us to control for district-specific 
unobserved heterogeneity while analysing the factors determining various teaching and 
non-teaching inputs at the district level.  
 
2.2 Data Description  
There are three broad types of recognised schools in India, namely, government 
schools, private aided schools (PA) and private unaided schools (PUA) schools.
15
 
                                                          
15
 In order to receive recognition, however PA and PUA schools must fulfil several requirements that are 
prohibitively expensive for many schools, especially those serving the poor (e.g., hold a sizeable cash 
bond with the government, provide sizeable playgrounds, etc.). 
 
93 
 
Government and aided schools are invariably ‘government-recognised’, i.e. they have 
the government stamp of approval. They are similar to each other in many respects 
since aided schools are almost entirely financed by the government and have little 
control over staffing (hiring/firing) and fee levels, despite being nominally privately 
managed. PUA schools (whether recognised or not) are more autonomous than aided 
schools and are totally self-funded out of fee income. Thus PUA schools are the truly 
‘private’ schools in India. Our analysis resource allocation in this paper focuses on fully 
funded government schools only, which are fully regulated by the relevant government 
department in the Indian states. 
 Table1 summarises the average characteristics of the sample districts over 
1992-2002. While average literacy is around 50% for India as a whole, there are 
striking intra- and inter-state variations in literacy across India. The literacy rate in 
Kerala is almost 100%, while there are some states where literacy is well below the 
national average of 50%. Even within a state, literacy is even lower among women, 
especially women belonging to the backward castes (23.76% as compared to 39.29% 
for all Indian women; Clots-Figueras, 2012). On an average, voter turnout is 57% for 
the sample as a whole, but again there can be wide variation as highlighted in the Table. 
Likewise, there are large variations in the provision of general infrastructure across 
government schools in India. For example, on an average 56% of total schools in a 
district are fully government funded while as high as 84% of government schools had 
pucca buildings. In contrast, only about 2% of government schools had access to 
drinking water in the school premise and only about 37% of these government schools 
had a lavatory for girls in the school premise.   
Next we compare the selected public school resources for the two sample years, 
namely, 1992 and 2002 (see Table 2). While there has been a slight rise in the share of 
government schools across sample districts, there has been a significant increase in 
pupil-teacher ratio (PTR), especially at the secondary level over the decade. There has 
also been a steady increase in most school inputs that we consider, namely access to 
drinking water, pucca building and lavatory within the school premise over the sample 
period 1992-2002. These changes have resulted in a significant increase in literacy for 
both 10-14 and 15-19 years old over the decade. But the question remains as to what 
extent the allocation of these resources have been influenced by various political 
economy factors that we consider. 
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3. Methodology 
 
As indicated earlier, our primary objective is to examine the determinants of the 
allocation of public school resources in a district with special reference to our central 
hypotheses. Thus for the i-th district in year t, share of any public school resource     
will be given by:  
 
                                                                           (1)     
                                                                  
In particular,    may refer a series of dependent variables of our interest indicating 
physical access to government schools, teaching and also various non-teaching inputs 
all of which enter the education production functions to boost performance. In 
particular, we consider (i) the share of government schools in total schools; (ii) pupils 
per teacher at primary, upper-primary and secondary levels; (iii) the average share of 
government schools with access to drinking water, pucca building and toilet in the 
school premise in the district.  
Our central hypotheses relate to that the role of average voter turnout (turnout), 
share of female (female_MLA) and share of low caste (lowcaste_MLA) legislators 
(elected for the state assembly) at the district level. Voter turnout shows the awareness 
of local citizens to local issues including education. In general, it is expected that local 
legislators would be more responsive to their clientele by raising Y if local turnout rate 
is high. In other words, the significance of the estimated coefficient of the turnout 
variable could signify the democratic accountability of local legislators towards the 
electorate. Identity of the local legislator, caste and gender, would in contrast signify if 
low caste and female assembly legislators in the district would favour spending on 
particular public school input because it would help their cohort. In addition, we 
include various district-level time-invariant (    and year-specific (   ,     refers to 
district and year specific random error term. 
It may however be possible that female and lowcaste MLAs are more accountable 
to voters only if turnout is higher in the particular district. In order to account for this 
effect, we next, we augment specification (1) by including the interaction terms 
between turnout and Female_MLA and also that between turnout and Lowcaste_MLA:  
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                                                                                                                        (2)
  
In other words, estimated coefficients of    and    would account for the differential 
effects of low caste and female legislators in high-turnout districts in our sample.  
 Further we argue that the district size as measured by number of constituencies 
(nconstituency) in a district could be an important argument to influence the allocation 
of public school resources in a district. This is because the higher the number of 
constituencies, the greater is number of representatives from the district, who can lobby 
for various public school resources. To this end, we augment specification (2) by the 
number of constituencies (nconstituency) in a district; we also include two interaction 
terms nconstituen*LowcasteMLA and nconstituency* FemaleMLA in order to identify the 
differential effect of low caste and female MLAs in larger districts, if any.   
 
                                                         
                                                          
                                                    
 
                                                  (3)                                                                                                   
 
While equations (1) - (3) control for various district-level time-invariant (    and year-
specific (    unobserved factors, there may still be some time-varying district-level 
unobserved factors which may influence the allocation of various public school 
resources. Hence, we augment specification (3) by including other control variables 
with a view to minimise the omitted variable bias, if any:  
 
    
                                                                               
                                                                               
                                                                                                    (4)                                                                             
 
The set of explanatory variables X in equation (4) accounts for other observed control 
variables. X includes an index of ethnic fractionalisation and poverty rate (hcr). The 
ethnic fractionalisation index is calculated as follows: 1-Σi pi
2
, where pi refers to the 
population share of i-th ethnic group in the districts, i=SC, ST and upper caste Hindu 
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and Muslim. Ethnic diversity may affect provision of public goods; the relationship 
could be attributed to taste differences of different sections of the population (Alesina, 
Baqir and Easterly, 1999), unequal distribution of the benefits from public goods 
(Khwaja, 2000) and/or inability to impose social sanctions in ethnically diverse 
communities (e.g., Miguel and Gugerty, 2005), thus leading to failures in collective 
actions. There is some recent literature that stresses the link between ethnic 
fractionalisation and the poor delivery of public services (e.g., see Alesina, Baqir and 
Easterly, 1999). Banerjee and Somanathan (2001) have extended the idea of ethnic 
diversity for the provision of public goods in the Indian districts and suggest that more 
heterogeneous communities tend to be politically weaker and therefore are less likely to 
get the goods they want and are more likely to get some of the inferior substitutes. In 
addition, we control for the head count poverty rate to examine if the poorer districts 
receive less allocation of public school resources. In view of the pronounced rural-
urban heterogeneity in India, we also control for rural location of the district with a 
view to identify the differential allocation of public school resources to rural areas, if 
any. 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
This section presents and analyses our estimation results. We start with the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimates of Y in terms of lagged explanatory variables. These 
estimates for specification (1) are shown in Appendix Table A1, which fail to identify 
any significant relationship in our sample. Note, however, that OLS suffers from both 
omitted variable and simultaneity bias arising from inclusion of potentially endogenous 
explanatory variables. Hence, our analysis relies on the fixed effects OLS estimates of 
equations (1)-(4) summarised in Tables 3-6, to which we now turn to. In doing so, we 
control for district and year-specific unobserved factors with a view to minimise any 
omitted variable bias in our estimates. Following the growing political economy 
literature on public goods provision we also argue that the key explanatory variables are 
purely exogenous and would not bias our estimates in any way. We develop our 
analysis in steps as outlined in equations (1)-(4), which also allows us to check the 
robustness of our estimates. Finally, we also estimate an extended model where we not 
only include the additional variable, but also control for district*year fixed effects to 
control for district-level time-varying unobserved factors (see Table 7). 
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4.1. FE-OLS estimates  
We develop our analysis in steps gradually extending our fixed effects panel data model 
controls to minimise omitted variable bias of estimates.  
We start with specification (1) to test the validity of our first and second 
hypotheses. We include both district and year specific fixed effects and cluster all 
standard errors at district level; the latter helps us to minimise any correlation of errors 
over the years for a given district. These robust FE-OLS estimates are shown in Table 
3, which allows us to exploit the variation of any Y over the two years for a given 
district to identify a causal effect of the chosen variables, namely, voter turnout and 
gender/caste of elected legislators. There is confirmation from these results that voter’s 
turnout significantly boost shares of government schools and lower pupil-teacher ratio 
(PTR) at various levels. However, the effect of voter turnout is limited on access to 
school physical infrastructures, especially pucca buildings. Greater turnout is also 
associated with significantly higher proportion of pucca school buildings in the district, 
but fails to have any significant effect on school’s access to drinking water and 
government schools with lavatory for girls.  
In contrast, the effect of gender/caste of the legislators has a rather limited effect 
on public school resource allocation in our sample. Women or SC/ST legislators fail to 
have any significant favourable effect on any school inputs, teaching or non-teaching. 
In fact, there is suggestion that districts with more women or SC/ST legislators tend to 
have lower proportion of government schools with pucca building.  
Next we augment specification (1) to include interaction terms between voter turnout 
and gender/caste of the legislators. These estimates are summarised in Table 4. These 
results reiterate the robust effect of voter turnout on share of government schools as 
well as pupil-teacher ratio. Now greater share of female and low-caste legislators are 
both associated with significantly greater share of government schools and lower pupil-
teacher ratio at the primary level. While districts with more low caste teachers have 
lower share of schools with drinking water, they tend to have significantly higher share 
of government schools with drinking water if the voter turnout is higher (as the 
interaction term is significant and positive). In other words, this evidence suggests the 
disciplining role of voter turnout on legislator behaviour to influence public policy.  
Table 5 shows the augmented estimates of equation 3 when number of 
constituencies in a district is included along with two interaction terms with gender and 
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caste of legislators. Reassuringly our estimates do not change much as we move from 
specification 2 to specification 3 as summarised in Table 5.  
One can however suspect that there are other time-varying factors that may 
influence various school inputs that we consider which in turn may bias our estimates. 
Accordingly, Table 6 augments specification (3) by including district-level ethnic 
heterogeneity, poverty head count rate (hcr) and also controls for the rural location, if 
any.  As before, districts with greater turnout tend to have significantly higher share of 
public schools and also lower pupil-teacher ratios in public schools at primary and 
upper-primary levels; the effect is not however significant at the secondary level. There 
is also an unexpected effect of higher turnout in that it is associated with significantly 
lower share of government schools with separate lavatory for girls. Districts with higher 
low caste MLAs do not have significantly better allocation of public school resources 
per se; however their effect turns out to be favourable and significant only for the 
districts with higher turnout; the effect is only significant and positive for the allocation 
of public schools with access to drinking water. Unfortunately, however, the weaker 
effect of female MLAs that we find in Table 4 vanishes in Table 5 and 6 as we control 
for number of constituencies in the district and its interactions terms. Clearly this result 
contradicts Clots-Figureas (2012) who find that presence of women legislators in the 
year of birth of the child improves child educational outcomes. However, our result is 
compatible to Pal and Ghosh (2012) who argued that the weaker effect of low caste and 
female MLAs in the allocation of education spending in Indian states can be attributed 
to their lower bargaining power in the state legislature. 
Among other results, we find that rural districts and also poorer districts tend to 
have significantly lower share of fully funded public schools, thus highlighting a bias 
against rural and poorer districts. Estimates of specification (4) suggest that ethnic 
fractionalization index is associated with significantly higher share of government 
schools with drinking water, but the effect remains insignificant in other respect. It is 
generally argued in the literature that heterogeneous communities tend to be politically 
weaker and therefore are less likely to get the goods they want and more likely to get 
some of the inferior substitutes (see Banerjee and Somanathan (2007). Perhaps this is 
an interesting result in that access to drinking water may be more important in more 
diverse districts where untouchability among certain castes is still prevalent.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
The paper examines the political economy determinants of the allocation of public 
school resources in Indian districts in the post reform period 1992-2002. In this respect, 
our analysis particularly focuses on the role of voter’s turnout, identity (gender/caste) of 
elected state assembly legislators and also the number of constituencies in a district. As 
such, this is not an analysis of all possible political economy variables determining 
allocation of public school resources across Indian districts and we accept that there 
may be other variables, e.g., political competition, that we have not included in the 
analysis. But we believe our methodology will minimize any omitted variable bias of 
our estimates. We particularly choose these variables as the voters (rather than 
politicians) have a direct influence on these factors and as such results from our 
analysis could yield important policy implications.     
Using various official sources, we put together a unique two-period district-level 
panel data for 1992 and 2002. Fixed effects panel data estimates highlight the aspect of 
the bias in the allocation of public school resources in Indian districts. We also control 
for various unobservable trends to minimise any further bias in our estimates. Results 
from our analysis provides some support to our first hypothesis that greater voter 
turnout is not only associated with greater share public schools, but also lower pupil-
teacher ratio in the district. However, gender and caste of the elected state legislators 
have a rather limited effect. We fail to identify any significant effect of female MLAs 
on the selected public school resources.  But the low caste legislators tend to have a 
significant effect on certain physical infrastructural inputs only when turnout and 
number of constituencies are higher. Further bias is identified in the allocation process, 
as the richer districts and also urban districts tend to have a greater share of public 
schools in our sample. Interestingly, greater ethnic fractionalisation is associated with 
greater share of government schools with drinking water facilities. While the existing 
literature generally tends to argue that ethnic fractionalisation leads to worse or inferior 
provision of public goods, we would argue that this result may have a social 
significance if untouchability is a problem in ethnically diverse communities, thus 
necessitating more demand for drinking water facilities within schools. Clearly, the 
current process seems to favour the larger districts and the districts with higher voter 
turnout, thus disregarding the needs of the poor and the marginalised. As such these 
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results raise concerns about the inequitable distribution of public school resources, 
which in turn may obstruct the attainment of universal literacy across all social classes 
and regions.   
It is therefore not very surprising as to why huge investment under SSA is failing 
to produce the desired outcome. On the positive sides, these results highlight the 
positive role of voters in attracting the attention of politicians in democratic set up as it 
is harder for democratically elected government to be unresponsive to the needs and 
values of their clientele, especially when the electorate is well informed and politically 
aware. So it is important to make voters aware of their rights to education. Further, 
given the problem of ensuring adequate allocation of public school resources for all and 
also that the link between increased school resources and student performance remains 
ambiguous in the literature (e.g., Hanushek, 1997)
16
, there remains a case for the 
introduction of school vouchers programme that would fund students (rather than 
schools), which may potentially be a more efficient as well as equitable than the current 
system for boosting education for all. This is because school vouchers financed and 
monitored/regulated by the state would empower parents with the purchasing power to 
find the best school for their children, thus inducing competition as well as incentives 
for improving both public and private schools. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 Leaving aside some studies on the impact of mid-day meals, there is a dearth of systematic studies on the 
effectiveness of ongoing public programmes in India aimed to boost school inputs. Available evidence suggests 
limited positive effect of mid-day meals on girls’ school attendance in Madhya Pradesh (Afridi, 2010).  
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Table 
 
Table 1: Variable definitions and descriptive statistics for sample districts, 1992-2002 
 
 
 
Table 2, Descriptive statistics: Variation of public school resources over the decade 1992-2002 
 
        1992 
 
2002 
 
Variable          Mean    
     Standard. 
      deviation          Mean          Std. Dev. 
Literacy rate 10-14  0.678943 0.160847 0.810496 0.130207 
Literacy rate 15-14  0.632984 0.153508 0.760741 0.133689 
Share of government school in total school (Pgsch) 0.550367 0.419528 0.578713 0.36632 
Pupils per teacher ratio, government upper primary (ptrgup)  38.02762 51.87547 39.2431 82.44183 
Pupils per teacher ratio, government secondary(ptrgs) 27.83853 8.631072 41.60052 153.5914 
Government schools with drinking water (pgdw)  0.580874 0.243233 0.786603 0.172426 
Government schools with pucca building (pgpucca)  0.857067 0.156957 0.832586 0.171241 
Government schools with lavatory for female (pglav)  0.33095 0.259546 0.428403 0.267213 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Observation Mean Standard. 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Literacy rate (litrt )                                                                                            713 .4966823 .1631373 .1447053 .9582419 
Share of government school in total school (pgsch) 767 .5635903 .3933929     .0010535       1.05665 
Government schools with drinking water (pgdw)                  763               .0213523 .2352175    .0213523 .997663 
government schools with pucca building (pgpucca)              766 .8444108 .1648442 0 1 
Government schools with lavatory for female (pglav)       816              .3794924 .2677733 .0106762 .99444 
Voters turnout (Turnout)                                                                                   684 57.1235 12.27586 12.27586 86.4 
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Table 3. FE-OLS estimates of various public school resources for specification (1) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Share of 
government 
school in 
total school 
Pupils per 
teacher , 
government 
primary 
Pupils per 
teacher, 
government 
upper 
primary 
Pupils per 
teacher , 
government 
secondary 
Government 
schools with 
drinking water 
Government 
schools with 
pucca 
building 
Government 
schools with 
lavatory for 
female 
        
Turnout 0.00315** -4.458* -0.912*** -0.477* -0.0025*** 0.00131** -0.00245** 
 (0.00138) (2.284) (0.310) (0.287) (0.000836) (0.000618) (0.00100) 
Lowcaste MLA -0.0252 191.7 3.006 46.14 -0.143 0.0672 -0.0169 
 (0.292) (228.6) (23.92) (48.66) (0.131) (0.114) (0.111) 
Female MLA 0.0996 -6.931 -16.58 16.73 0.173 -0.154** -0.0521 
 (0.117) (92.97) (20.38) (57.72) (0.112) (0.0643) (0.120) 
Constant 0.312*** 268.5** 90.32*** 45.08*** 0.758*** 0.777*** 0.505*** 
 (0.112) (133.6) (16.97) (9.970) (0.0589) (0.0463) (0.0666) 
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 610 598 613 645 597 611 645 
R-squared 0.066 0.018 0.019 0.010 0.560 0.082 0.154 
Number of districts 333 311 326 335 336 333 337 
 
      Robust standard errors in parentheses (all standard errors are clustered at district level) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. FE-OLS including interaction terms with turnout, specification 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Share of 
government 
school in total 
school 
Pupils per 
teacher , 
government 
primary 
Pupils per 
teacher, 
government 
upper primary 
Pupils per 
teacher , 
government 
secondary 
Government 
schools with 
drinking water 
Government 
schools with 
pucca building 
Government 
schools with 
lavatory for 
female 
        
Turnout 0.0108*** -6.675** -1.595** -0.916 -0.007*** 0.00226* -0.00242 
 (0.00307) (3.371) (0.726) (1.593) (0.00199) (0.00122) (0.00149) 
Female MLA 1.770** -938.6* -76.10 165.8 0.166 0.111 -0.871 
 (0.806) (561.6) (130.6) (219.8) (0.504) (0.396) (0.575) 
Lowcaste 
MLA 
1.638** -202.5 -151.3 -85.96 -1.236*** 0.260 0.132 
 (0.713) (480.6) (126.2) (286.9) (0.445) (0.334) (0.317) 
Female 
MLA*turnout 
-0.0276** 15.42 0.981 -2.485 -0.000268 -0.00438 0.0136 
 (0.0122) (9.825) (2.403) (3.005) (0.00832) (0.00643) (0.00876) 
 
Lowcaste  -0.0282*** 6.679 2.808 2.384 0.0198*** -0.00326 -0.00268 
MLA*turnout (0.0101) (10.92) (2.602) (5.905) (0.00765) (0.00489) (0.00513) 
 
Constant -0.160 404.0** 130.0*** 70.52 1.017*** 0.719*** 0.504*** 
 (0.212) (171.4) (38.20) (84.09) (0.122) (0.0834) (0.0966) 
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 610 598 613 645 597 611 645 
R-squared 0.123 0.019 0.023 0.011 0.571 0.084 0.158 
Number of 
districts 
333 311 326 335 336 333 337 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (all standard errors are clustered at district level) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
104 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. FE-OLS estimates of various public school resources for specification 3  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Share of 
government 
school in 
total school 
Pupils per 
teacher , 
government 
primary 
Pupils per 
teacher, 
government 
upper 
primary 
Pupils per 
teacher , 
government 
secondary 
Government 
schools with 
drinking 
water 
Government 
schools with 
pucca 
building 
Government 
schools with 
lavatory for 
female 
        
Turnout 0.011*** -6.287* -1.900*** -0.755 -0.006*** 0.00254** -0.0031** 
 (0.00313) (3.312) (0.715) (1.511) (0.00207) (0.00123) (0.00155) 
Lowcaste MLA 1.348* -539.6 -124.4 -103.3 -1.232*** -0.0369 0.214 
 (0.754) (740.7) (140.7) (293.8) (0.419) (0.337) (0.332) 
Female MLA 1.488* -1,332 -34.57 202.9 0.253 0.372 -0.751 
 (0.761) (873.5) (240.1) (256.3) (0.547) (0.391) (0.682) 
 
Number of  0.00767 -25.58 7.228 -3.354 0.0206** 0.00893 0.0578*** 
constituency (0.0142) (34.79) (4.787) (4.658) (0.00922) (0.0268) (0.0161) 
 
lowcaste -0.029*** 5.586 3.880 1.795 0.0164** -0.00400 -0.000111 
MLA*turnout (0.0102) (10.71) (2.442) (5.609) (0.00797) (0.00486) (0.00530) 
 
Female MLA*turnout -0.0269** 16.57 0.907 -2.555 -0.000955 -0.00533 0.0131 
 (0.0121) (10.78) (2.845) (3.115) (0.00842) (0.00633) (0.00907) 
 
Number of constituency 0.0565 62.80 -22.66 11.40 0.0444* 0.0498* -0.0568 
*lowcaste MLA (0.0572) (82.44) (16.71) (8.398) (0.0239) (0.0297) (0.0367) 
 
Number of constituency 0.0376* 50.95 -6.473 -5.046 -0.00565 -0.0308 -0.0151 
*female MLA (0.0198) (52.37) (15.91) (6.008) (0.0227) (0.0199) (0.0304) 
Constant -0.316 584.9 105.9** 82.36 0.700*** 0.582** 0.0338 
 (0.257) (417.1) (52.22) (108.6) (0.156) (0.287) (0.176) 
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 610 598 613 645 597 611 645 
R-squared 0.132 0.020 0.037 0.011 0.576 0.102 0.173 
Number of districts 333 311 326 335 336 333 337 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (all standard errors are clustered at district level) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6. FE-OLS estimates of various public school resources for the complete specification 4  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Share of 
government 
school in 
total school 
Pupils per 
teacher , 
government 
primary 
Pupils per 
teacher, 
government 
upper 
primary 
Pupils per 
teacher , 
government 
secondary 
Government 
schools with 
drinking 
water 
Government 
schools with 
pucca 
building 
Government 
schools with 
lavatory for 
female 
        
Turnout 0.013*** -17.27* -3.942** -1.760 -0.00546 0.00296 -0.0074** 
 (0.00455) (8.800) (1.588) (3.232) (0.00355) (0.00262) (0.00325) 
Lowcaste MLA 0.950 -0.959 27.77 -93.15 -1.614*** -0.215 0.266 
 (0.834) (1,030) (321.5) (468.8) (0.603) (0.400) (0.541) 
Female MLA 1.097 -1,123 -1.532 382.3 0.235 0.228 -0.808 
 (0.876) (935.2) (294.0) (406.8) (0.735) (0.503) (0.797) 
 
Number of constituency 0.0245 54.97 13.33* -1.579 0.0450*** 0.0476 0.0721*** 
 (0.0302) (53.87) (7.083) (3.275) (0.0161) (0.0857) (0.0153) 
 
Lowcaste MLA*turnout -0.0277** 13.99 5.237 2.987 0.0229*** -0.00272 0.00500 
 (0.0117) (15.60) (3.579) (8.525) (0.00865) (0.00606) (0.00713) 
 
Female MLA*turnout -0.0231 11.27 0.412 -5.577 -0.000790 -0.00426 0.0104 
 (0.0154) (11.60) (3.457) (5.090) (0.0111) (0.00881) (0.0108) 
 
Number of constituency 0.0734 65.65 -47.59 3.197 0.0335 0.0652** -0.0911* 
*lowcaste MLA (0.0555) (88.53) (35.25) (12.44) (0.0451) (0.0314) (0.0506) 
 
Number of constituency 0.0577* 76.41 -4.901 -0.649 -0.0104 -0.0235 0.0147 
*female MLA (0.0342) (60.08) (20.91) (8.571) (0.0295) (0.0261) (0.0331) 
 
Ethnic heterogeneity -0.120 46.81 -101.0* -56.40 0.770** 0.0638 -0.219 
 (0.582) (407.8) (56.26) (94.87) (0.364) (0.231) (0.320) 
Rural -5.12e-08* 0.000110 2.31e-06 1.56e-05 -1.48e-08 -8.05e-09 2.77e-08 
 (3.05e-08) (7.26e-05) (5.92e-06) (1.40e-05) (1.75e-08) (2.04e-08) (2.05e-08) 
HCR -0.309** 189.9 23.95 -128.5 -0.0573 -0.0164 0.163 
 (0.146) (125.6) (17.78) (124.6) (0.135) (0.0811) (0.108) 
Constant -0.406 153.2 195.0** 152.1 0.207 0.139 0.142 
 (0.412) (595.6) (93.83) (199.7) (0.305) (0.890) (0.270) 
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 529 521 530 561 514 530 562 
R-squared 0.178 0.038 0.069 0.021 0.574 0.083 0.182 
Number of districts 304 286 298 307 306 304 309 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (all standard errors are clustered at district level) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Variable definitions and sources 
Variable Abbreviation Data source Mean (standard 
deviation) 
Dependent variable Pupils per teacher 
ratio, government upper primary 
PTR upper primary All India School 
Education Survey 
(AISES) data 1992-93 
(6th) and 2002-03 (7th) 
and Census data (1991 
and 2001). 
38.8 (68.7)  
Dependent variable Pupils per teacher 
ratio, government secondary 
PTR secondary All India School 
Education Survey 
(AISES) data 1992-93 
(6th) and 2002-03 (7th) 
and Census data (1991 
and 2001). 
34.7 (108.6)   
Dependent variable Government schools 
with drinking water 
PGDW All India School 
Education Survey 
(AISES) data 1992-93 
(6th) and 2002-03 (7th) 
and Census data (1991 
and 2001). 
0.681 (0.235) 
Dependent variable government schools 
with pucca building 
PGPUCCA All India School 
Education Survey 
(AISES) data 1992-93 
(6th) and 2002-03 (7th) 
and Census data (1991 
and 2001). 
0.844 (0.165)           
Dependent variable Government schools 
with lavatory for female 
PGLAV All India School 
Education Survey 
(AISES) data 1992-93 
(6th) and 2002-03 (7th) 
and Census data (1991 
and 2001). 
0.379 (0.268)       
Independent variable: proportion of seat 
won by low caste women in the district 
lowcasteMLA Collected from different 
volumes of the 
Statistical Reports on 
the General Elections to 
the Legislative 
Assemblies from ECI.  
0.221 (0.200)           
Independent variable: Proportion of seat 
won by women in the district elections 
FemaleMLA Collected from different 
volumes of the 
Statistical Reports on 
the General Elections to 
the Legislative 
Assemblies from ECI. 
0.047 (0.085)           
Independent variable:  
Ratio of total voters in the district to total 
registered voters. 
Turnout Collected from different 
volumes of the 
Statistical Reports on 
the General Elections to 
the Legislative 
Assemblies from ECI. 
61.95 (10.54)      
Independent variable:  
Total number of constituency in a district 
Nconstituency Collected from different 
volumes of the 
Statistical Reports on 
the General Elections to 
the Legislative 
Assemblies from ECI. 
10.16 (6.14) 
 
Ethnic heterogeneity index Ethhety Created from Census  0 .358 (0.121)   
Poverty head count ratio HCR NSS data 0.227 (0.122)           
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Table A2. OLS estimates of public school resources with lagged explanatory variables,  specification 1 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Share of 
government 
school in total 
school 
Pupils per 
teacher ratio, 
government 
primary 
Pupils per 
teacher ratio, 
government 
upper primary 
Pupils per 
teacher ratio, 
government 
secondary 
Government 
schools with 
drinking 
water 
government 
schools with 
pucca 
building 
Government 
schools with 
lavatory for 
female 
        
Turnout -0.00203 8.230 0.0401 -1.655 0.00177 -0.00177 -0.00134 
 (0.00149) (8.008) (0.604) (2.952) (0.00121) (0.00111) (0.00150) 
Lowcaste MLA -0.137* -90.92 -15.48 -9.797 -0.0165 -0.0288 0.0112 
 (0.0707) (130.2) (14.84) (33.88) (0.0544) (0.0390) (0.0428) 
Female MLA 0.0193 -662.4 -38.37 -21.03 0.147 0.0296 0.110 
 (0.0910) (575.6) (46.56) (22.75) (0.0933) (0.0614) (0.111) 
EthnicHeterogeneity 0.0846 81.79 -21.41 -127.4 0.00814 -0.0800 -0.0759 
 (0.0983) (363.1) (24.20) (108.2) (0.0991) (0.0617) (0.0996) 
Rural  5.21e-09 -2.16e-05 6.40e-06 -3.02e-06 1.40e-09 -2.10e-09 -1.54e-08 
 (7.89e-09) (4.94e-05) (3.94e-06) (3.79e-06) (8.88e-09) (5.48e-09) (1.30e-08) 
Hcr 0.168* 29.74 -31.66 80.86 -0.128* 0.00191 -0.257** 
 (0.0869) (159.4) (27.17) (88.62) (0.0767) (0.0496) (0.101) 
Constant 0.182 -523.2 25.26 171.8 0.582*** 0.895*** 0.549*** 
 (0.122) (608.6) (51.13) (224.9) (0.0924) (0.0839) (0.119) 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 284 265 267 288 256 284 290 
R-squared 0.902 0.254 0.680 0.089 0.546 0.748 0.744 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (all standard errors are clustered at district level) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
All explanatory variables are lagged, i.e., they refer to the initial year 1992 
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Table A3. Estimates of an extended model including voting margin of the winner 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Share of 
government 
school in 
total school 
Pupils per 
teacher , 
government 
primary 
Pupils per 
teacher, 
government 
upper primary 
Pupils per 
teacher , 
government 
secondary 
Government 
schools with 
drinking 
water 
Government 
schools with 
pucca 
building 
Government 
schools with 
lavatory for 
female 
        
Turnout  0.0128*** -18.69** -4.005** -1.512 -0.00645* 0.00301 -0.00742** 
 (0.00456) (9.456) (1.627) (3.391) (0.00361) (0.00264) (0.00330) 
Femalemla  1.081 -1333 -8.194 409.5 0.111 0.228 -0.804 
 (0.875) (992.8) (298.5) (407.9) (0.743) (0.501) (0.803) 
Lowcastemla  0.949 -977.5 27.50 -84.86 -1.641*** -0.218 0.267 
 (0.834) (1029) (322.3) (474.9) (0.609) (0.402) (0.540) 
Female*turnout -0.0230 13.25 0.462 -5.782 0.000205 -0.00426 0.0104 
 (0.0153) (12.15) (3.492) (5.083) (0.0112) (0.00876) (0.0108) 
Lowcast*turnout -0.0276** 15.02 5.266 2.714 0.0240*** -0.00268 0.00495 
 (0.0117) (15.65) (3.595) (8.693) (0.00883) (0.00607) (0.00712) 
Nconstituency  0.0251 61.43 13.67* -2.980 0.0499*** 0.0473 0.0719*** 
 (0.0307) (59.20) (6.981) (3.325) (0.0164) (0.0864) (0.0154) 
Nconstituency*female 0.0589* 92.51 -4.242 -3.577 -0.00254 -0.0234 0.0142 
 (0.0359) (63.20) (21.47) (9.204) (0.0310) (0.0270) (0.0343) 
Nconstituency*lowcaste 0.0731 61.49 -47.75 4.134 0.0311 0.0654** -0.0909* 
 (0.0555) (88.62) (35.20) (12.39) (0.0449) (0.0314) (0.0507) 
Mean winning margin -0.0244 -323.9 -9.726 56.56 -0.229 -0.00129 0.00927 
 (0.0746) (271.8) (14.41) (67.29) (0.176) (0.0492) (0.0636) 
ethhety -0.120 37.91 -99.78* -58.49 0.779** 0.0581 -0.218 
 (0.583) (409.8) (56.59) (93.37) (0.358) (0.230) (0.320) 
rural -5.12e-08* 0.000110 2.40e-06 1.55e-05 -1.18e-08 -8.17e-09 2.77e-08 
 (3.06e-08) (7.27e-05) (5.92e-06) (1.40e-05) (1.76e-08) (2.04e-08) (2.05e-08) 
hcr -0.308** 212.2* 24.93 -131.5 -0.0612 -0.0172 0.162 
 (0.147) (128.1) (18.43) (127.7) (0.136) (0.0819) (0.109) 
Constant -0.401 214.2 195.7** 145.0 0.242 0.143 0.142 
 (0.414) (651.1) (94.60) (204.7) (0.305) (0.890) (0.272) 
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 527 519 528 559 512 528 560 
R-squared 0.178 0.041 0.070 0.022 0.575 0.085 0.182 
Number of districts 303 285 297 306 305 303 308 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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    Table A4: Distribution of 1991 and 2001 sample districts across selected states 
States 1991 
districts 
2001 
districts 
Sample 
districts 
unchanged 
AP 23 23 22 
Assam 23 23 22 
Bihar+Jharkhand 42 37+18 28+12 
Gujarat 19 25 12 
Haryana 16 19 6 
Himachal 12 12 12 
J&K 14 14 14 
Karanataka 20 27 18 
Kerala 14 14 13 
MP+ Chhatisgarh 45 45+16 37+6 
Maharashtra 30 35 30 
Orissa 13 30 13 
Punjab 12 17 3 
Rajasthan 27 32 26 
Tamli Nadu 21 30 20 
UP+Uttaranchal 63 70+13 45+5 
WB 17 18 17 
Total  411 518 361 
Source: Tables 1 and 7 from Kumar and Somanathan (2009) 
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Chapter 5: conclusion of thesis 
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Chapter 5 conclusion 
 
This thesis has examined human capital in the form of education and explored how the 
role of the government and education policy has affected educational attainment and 
economic growth. 
In chapter 2 we presented cross-country evidence on the effectiveness of public 
spending on educational outcomes. it has also improves our understanding of the links 
between public spending and governance .The results highlight the importance of 
GMM estimates and suggests that government spending on education has positive and 
significant effect on educational attainment at all levels and the effect is largest at the 
primary level. We however fail to identify any significant beneficial effect of 
government education spending on primary and secondary enrolment levels, which 
primarily been guided by household decisions. Further despite very high level of 
government education spending in Africa, we do not find any statistically significant 
effect on educational attainment or enrolment in Africa who needs it most. 
This evidence implies that just providing more resources is unlikely to improve 
student performance if future actions of schools follow their past behaviour. While 
schools i n  s o m e  r e g i o n s  seem to make good use of additional resources, 
others do not. In other words, a general increase in school resources does not 
necessarily promise significant positive improvements in student performance. A 
possible solution may lie in changing the incentive structure of the main actors in the 
schooling system rather than changing the level of available resources. Our findings 
also indicate that in countries which are rated as corrupt, public spending on education 
at the margin is ineffective. 
We also find in chapter 3 that changes in the educational institutional structure 
are fundamental to improving school outcomes and human capital accumulation. The 
results show that interaction effects of cognitive skills and institutional structures have 
a significant impact on economic growth. In particular, the marginal contributions of 
cognitive skills, choice, autonomy and accountability to long-run growth (both direct 
and indirect) are unambiguously positive. The results also reflect that economic growth 
accelerates the process of cognitive skills in the presence of good institutions, therefore 
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economic growth is vital in increasing good institutions. One could provide a more 
detailed interpretation of alternative educational policies in the context of this model of 
quality versus quantity, although our main point in this discussion was to show that 
public support to education needs to be adequately designed and channelled in order to 
be unambiguously growth-enhancing. 
Finally in chapter 4 there is confirmation from our results that voter’s turnout 
significantly boost shares of government schools and also their access to several school 
infrastructures, especially pucca buildings. Greater turnout is also associated with 
significantly lower pupil-teacher ratio (PTR) at various levels. In other words, these 
results highlight the power of democracy in ensuring better allocation of public school 
resources.  
The intuition behind our research is that what matters most for economic 
performance and efficiency in education is the provision of a set of institutional factors 
that will produce the motivation needed to succeed, both to teachers and to students. 
This institutional structure encompasses competition, accountability, choice and 
efficient public spending with redistributive objectives and this clearly transcends the 
traditional division between public and private schools. In some countries public 
schools have become relatively efficient by decentralization, by being allowed to be 
independent and autonomous in their decisions, competing openly with their 
counterparts in the system. The effects of these institutional factors on economic growth 
will determine whether public spending on education is efficient for attacking the 
problem of poor economic growth. 
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